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Abstract 
 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have an inherent lack of security and situational 
awareness capabilities at the field device level. Yet these systems comprise a significant 
portion of the nation’s critical infrastructure. Currently, there is little insight into the 
characterization of attacks on ICS. Stuxnet provided an initial look at the type of tactics 
that can be employed to create physical damage via cyber means. The question still 
remains, however, as to the extent of malware and attacks that are targeting the critical 
infrastructure, along with the various methods employed to target systems associated with 
the ICS environment.  
This research presents a device using Gumstix technology that emulates an ICS 
field device.  The emulation device is low-cost, adaptable to myriad ICS environments 
and provides logging capabilities at the field device level. The device was evaluated to 
ensure conformity to RFC standards through the use of Triangle MicroWorks and that the 
operating characteristics are consistent with actual field devices.   The device was also 
evaluated in that the device can respond as a PLC to common fingerprinting techniques.  
The device was able to respond according to RFC standards and does respond as a valid 
PLC to common fingerprinting techniques. 
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EMULATING INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM FIELD DEVICES USING 
GUMSTIX TECHNOLOGY 
I.  Introduction 
Industrial control systems (ICS) constitute a significant portion of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure.  The power grid, transportation, oil and gas, and public works 
sectors rely heavily on the proper operation of control systems.  A major disruption of 
any of these systems may result in devastating consequences.  The limitations in ICS 
security have resulted in numerous failures, both targeted and un-targeted.  In 2003, the 
Sobig virus infected computers at the Amtrak dispatching headquarters, causing signaling 
systems to shut down and halt ten trains between Pennsylvania and South Carolina [29]. 
The Slammer worm penetrated a computer at an Ohio nuclear plant in 2003, causing the 
safety monitoring system to be disabled for nearly five hours [33].  Most notably, the 
recent Stuxnet virus targeted specific operating characteristics to create direct physical 
consequences [22]. 
1.1 Problem Definition 
Attacks on networking systems follow a general pattern and can be categorized 
according to the following sequential steps: reconnaissance, scanning, gaining access, 
maintaining access and covering tracks [37].  During reconnaissance and scanning, an 
attacker or malware obtains information about the targeted system. Security mechanisms 
(e.g., intrusion detection systems, antivirus and honeypots) are employed in traditional 
Information Technology (IT) systems to detect these malicious actions and provide early 
indicators of potential impending attacks.  For ICS, however, security mechanisms 
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designed specifically for the ICS environment are presently minimal.  Indeed, there is 
lack of monitoring capabilities at the field device level.  The field device level includes 
programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that control and monitor the physical operating 
parameters.  Security monitoring at these end points needs to be improved to detect 
malicious actions and provide early indicators of potential impending attacks. 
End system devices such as PLCs lack the inherent processing power, memory or 
system capabilities to incorporate security programs. Additionally, the highly dispersed 
nature of ICS operations requires extensive costs to retrofit security solutions. Finally, the 
lack of logging capabilities inhibits forensic ability to characterize attack tactics that are 
targeted towards the ICS environment. 
1.2 Goals 
 The goal of this research is to include attack detection within ICS at the field 
device level.  Specifically, this research develops an inexpensive, configurable, and 
portable emulation device that provides logging capabilities.  The solution provides a 
low-cost security device that can be readily configured for implementation across many 
ICS environments.  The PLC emulation device can be employed as an early detection 
sensor, introduces logging capabilities at the field device level, and can help characterize 
cyber attacks against ICS systems.   
 The emulated PLC should respond in accordance to RFC standards with any user 
that may try to interact with it directly.  Additionally, the device must be capable of 
handling invalid traffic and respond to common fingerprinting techniques in a manner 
that will emulate an operational PLC.  The device must handle all forms of traffic and be 
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able to record any interaction with the emulated PLC.  It is also expected to evade being 
fingerprinted as a Linux device while logging any interactions. 
1.3 Scope and Limitations 
The scope of this research focuses on emulation of Modbus TCP communication 
of a PLC.  The six most common functions used in Modbus TCP traffic are emulated on 
the Gumstix technology to show that the emulation can be achieved.  It is expected that 
further functions of the Modbus TCP specification can be added in future development 
iterations.  It is also expected that additional protocols and services much like the 
Modbus protocol can be implemented in future development. 
The research is limited by the inability to access a full ICS operational system.  
The test environment, however, is derived such that findings are expected to be consistent 
with an operational ICS.  Additionally, a common method to fingerprint ICS devices is 
through Ethernet header manufacturer tags.  These tags are represented as Ethernet 
trailers in many common packet dissection platforms, such as Wireshark.  Due to lack of 
access to operational PLCs that implement the Ethernet tags, this technique is not 
evaluated.  It is expected that in future research the tags can be analyzed and readily 
implemented. 
1.4 Organization 
Chapter 2 presents background information about ICS, ICS security and critical 
infrastructure protection.  The Modbus protocol is described along with related research 
for ICS security measures.  Finally, material on emulation in both the IT and ICS sector is 
presented. 
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Chapter 3 presents the methodology used in this research.  This chapter describes 
the tests created to validate the emulation of the PLC device.  Tests are compiled to cover 
a variety of traffic scenarios a fielded PLC encounters. 
Chapter 4 presents the results from the tests described in Chapter 3.  The results 
from these tests are presented based on each test scenario.  The results demonstrate how 
the emulated device responds as an operational PLC would respond to common 
fingerprinting techniques used in ICS networks.  
Chapter 5 presents the conclusions and future work for this research.  This section 
is followed by several appendices with material to both support the results given in 
Chapter 4 and to allow other to reproduce the emulated PLC on a Gumstix Overo board. 
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II. Background 
2.1 Overview 
 This section discusses topics associated with industrial control systems (ICS), 
critical infrastructure protection, emulation, and related research.  The United States has 
seen a significant and steady increase in cyber attacks on both traditional information 
technology (IT) networks and ICS [20].  Some of these systems are crucial to our national 
critical infrastructure, and greater efforts and attention are being focused on securing ICS 
systems.  Recommendations by the National Office for Cyberspace include working with 
regulatory agencies to develop governing policies for ICS and also work to secure 
government-owned critical infrastructures. 
 As an example of the emerging threat, Stuxnet demonstrated the damage that can 
be caused by malware that targets ICS.  Stuxnet showed that an attack on ICS networks is 
possible and the effects of such an attack can be detrimental.  Stuxnet was able to 
manipulate physical devices connected to the PLC to operate outside their normal 
parameters, sabotaging these devices [10].  Similar attacks are more likely as 
organizations increasingly connect their ICS networks to their corporate networks, 
providing additional attack vectors into ICS networks. 
2.2 Industrial Control Systems Background 
 ICS manage, direct and monitor the behavior of large-scale, distributed systems in 
the critical infrastructure sectors. ICS use central monitoring stations, typically with a 
human machine interface (HMI) for an operator in the loop, to control and monitor 
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remote processes [2].  ICS networks control critical infrastructure such as gas and oil 
pipelines, electric transmission, manufacturing, and many other critical infrastructures.   
Figure 2.1 shows the devices typical to an ICS network and their traditional 
configuration.  A Primary Control Center controls and monitors the overall operations.  
Within the Primary Control Center is the human machine interface (HMI) station, 
Control Server (Master Terminal Unit), Data Historian and Engineering Workstations. 
  The HMI provides the data to an operator in a Graphical User Interface (GUI).  
The GUI allows the operator to interact with the field devices in such a manner that the 
data is easily interpreted.  The Control Server, many times referred to as the Master 
Terminal Unit (MTU), presents data to the HMI while also transmitting data from the 
HMI to field devices [19].  The Data Historian stores all the data that is reported to the 
MTU; this data is used by the engineers at their workstations to determine the efficiency 
of the network and billing purposes. 
 Figure 2.1 also shows a Backup Control Center which is a replica of the Primary 
Control Center that can assume control in case of a potential power outage or natural 
disaster in the region.  The Primary and Backup Control Centers communicate through 
radio signals and Ethernet-based communications to remote stations via specialized 
protocols.  The Remote Stations consist of field devices and the actuators and sensors that 
are connected to the field devices. 
 PLCs are field devices that communicate with the monitoring stations and convert 
digital control messages into physical actions such as opening and closing valves and 
breakers, collecting data from sensor systems, and monitoring the local environment for 
alarm conditions.  There are several proprietary and open source protocols designed 
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specifically for communications in ICS networks including: Modbus, DNP3, ProfiNet, 
Ethernet  IP and many others [24], [40], [34]. 
 
Figure 2.1: ICS network configuration [39]. 
The Regional Control Center is used in larger ICS networks to handle a 
subsection of the network (e.g., power generation facility in a power company).  These 
control centers consist of a HMI and a MTU for local control of the network subsection.  
The ICS network is commonly connected to the Corporate Enterprise Network to allow 
authorized employees access to an HMI station, many times with read only access, to 
view the current status of the network. 
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The communication architecture for control systems uses a hierarchical, request-
response paradigm for message transmission between a master control device and remote 
field devices.  The master sends request messages to the outlying field device to gather 
data or to specify control actions.  The field device collects discrete and analog sensor 
data and maintains actuator settings specified by the master. Response messages are 
generated by the field device after direct requests from the master.  Additionally, the field 
device may notify the master when alarm conditions are detected. 
2.3 Modbus Protocol 
Modbus, designed in 1979, is one of the widest implemented communication 
protocols in the industrial control system environment [26].  Originally designed for 
serial communication, messages are transmitted between a master and field devices.  The 
Modbus message format, depicted in Figure 2.2, contains three fields: outstation slave 
address, Modbus application protocol data unit (PDU), and an error checking field (CRC) 
[24].  The slave address identifies the intended recipient, with each device on the network 
assigned a unique identifier.  The application PDU is comprised of a one byte function 
code specifying desired actions and up to 252 bytes for function parameters.  The CRC 
Figure 2.2: Modbus serial message format. 
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field is used to identify integrity errors that occur during message exchange.  
To leverage the benefits and cost savings of LAN/WAN technologies, Modbus 
was modified for transmission to accommodate TCP/IP channels.  Indeed, Modbus TCP 
extends the serial implementation by enabling a master to have multiple outstanding 
transactions, and an outstation to engage in concurrent communications with multiple 
masters [25].  In addition to the original serial message data fields, a Modbus application 
protocol (MBAP) header is added to facilitate IP communication. Figure 2.3 shows the 
message format of a Modbus TCP packet.  The MBAP header contains a transaction ID, 
protocol designator, data length and unit id number.  The Modbus data frame is 
encapsulated as a TCP payload and transmitted using Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) designated port 502. 
The Modbus specification identifies a common set of function codes.  The basic 
function codes implemented in the majority of systems are listed below, with the hex 
representation identified in parenthesis.  Note that individual implementation schemes 
may use additional function codes designated by the standard for individual system 
configuration. 
Figure 2.3: Modbus TCP message format. 
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  (0x01) Read Coils - This function code is used to read from 1 to 2000 contiguous 
status of coils in a remote device. 
 
 (0x02) Read Discrete Inputs - This function code is used to read from 1 to 2000 
contiguous status of discrete inputs in a remote device. 
 
 (0x03) Read Holding Registers - This function code is used to read the contents of 
a contiguous block of holding registers in a remote device. 
 
 (0x04) Read Input Registers - This function code is used to read from 1 to 125 
contiguous input registers in a remote device. 
 
 (0x05) Write Single Coil - This function code is used to write a single output to 
either ON or OFF in a remote device. 
 
 (0x06) Write Single Register - This function code is used to write a single holding 
register in a remote device. 
 
 (0x0F) Write Multiple Coils - This function code is used to force each coil in a 
sequence of coils to either ON or OFF in a remote device. 
 
 (0x10) Write Multiple Registers - This function code is used to write a block of 
contiguous registers (1 to 123 registers) in a remote device. 
 
 (0x14) Read File Record - This function code is used to perform a file record 
read. 
 
 (0x15) Write File Record - This function code is used to perform a file record 
write. 
 
 (0x16) Mask Write Register - This function code is used to modify the contents of 
a specified holding register using a combination of an AND mask, an OR mask, 
and the register's current contents. 
 
 (0x17) Read/Write Multiple Registers - This function code performs a 
combination of one read operation and one write operation in a single MODBUS 
transaction. 
 
 (0x18) Read FIFO Queue - This function code allows the read the contents of a 
First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queue of register in a remote device. 
 
 (0x2B) Encapsulated Interface Transport (EIT) - The MODBUS Encapsulated 
Interface (MEI)Transport is a mechanism for tunneling service requests and 
method invocations, as well as their returns, inside MODBUS PDUs. 
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Consider, for example, communication from a master device to a PLC to close a 
valve in an oil and gas pipeline.  The master generates a request message that specifies a 
write action with opcode 05 for address 01 containing data value FF to close the control 
valve.  The PLC performs the action and responds with a reply message containing 
opcode 05 and address 01 to indicate completion of the action.  Subsequent read requests 
from the master returns a value indicating the valve is closed. 
2.4 Critical Infrastructure Protection 
 Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) relates to the preparedness to an incident 
involving critical infrastructure.  In testimony to Congress by Gregory C. Wilshusen, 
Director, Information Security Issues, defines CI as: 
 “Critical infrastructures are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to our nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitation impact 
on national security, economic well-being, public health or safety, or any combination of 
these” [11]. 
 Critical Infrastructure is divided into 18 sectors based on Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) [13].  In HSPD-7, the President designates the 
Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal Federal official to lead Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) protection efforts” and assigns responsibilities 
to Federal Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs).  The list of sectors and their corresponding 
SSAs are provided in Table 2.1.  This directive provides the criteria for establishing 
additional sectors of protection in the future.  Many of these sectors are very complex and 
interconnected in such a way that if one of these sectors is disrupted it could cause 
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disruption in other sectors.  An example of this is if an attacker is able to prevent the 
transmission of power to other facilities such as a manufacturing plant, production at that 
plant halts.  A similar condition occurred in 2003 when a fault in the power grid caused 
an estimated 55 million people to lose power [30].  As a result, boil water advisories went 
into effect, train service in the region shut down, airports in the region shut down, many 
oil refineries on the east coast had to shut down, cellular communications was disrupted 
due to cell towers backup generators shut off, and many large factories had to stop or 
slow productions because of supply problems.   Although the effects were not caused by 
a malicious actor, the scenario demonstrates the impact to critical services.  
Table 2.1: Sector-Specific Agencies and assigned CIKR sectors [5][6][28]. 
Sector Specific Agency Critical Infrastructure and  
Key Resources Sector 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Health and Human Services 
Agriculture and Food 
Department of Defense Defense Industrial Base 
Department of Energy Energy 
Department of Health and Human Services Healthcare and Public Health 
Department of the Interior National Monuments and Icons 
Department of the Treasury Banking and Finance 
Environmental Protection Agency Water 
Department of Homeland Security 
     Office of Infrastructure Protection 
Chemical  
Commercial Facilities 
Critical Manufacturing 
Dams 
Emergency Services 
Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste 
     Office of Cybersecurity  
     and Communications 
Information Technology 
Communications 
     Transportation Security Administration Postal and Shipping 
     Transportation Security Administration 
     United States Coast Guard Transportation Systems 
     Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
     Federal Protective Service Government Facilities 
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2.5 Industrial Control Systems Security 
 Control systems offer unique security challenges [17].  A primary benefit of 
control systems is that remote and isolated locations can be monitored centrally without 
the need for onsite personnel.  From a security standpoint, however, this provides entry 
points into the system that have minimal physical safeguards.  Additionally, the trend to 
interconnect devices using networking technologies introduces entry points, often via the 
Internet.  
The limitations in ICS security have resulted in numerous failures, both targeted 
and un-targeted.  In 2003, the Sobig virus infected computers at the Amtrak dispatching 
headquarters, causing signaling systems to shut down and halt ten trains between 
Pennsylvania and South Carolina [29].  The Slammer worm penetrated a computer at an 
Ohio nuclear plant in 2003, causing the safety monitoring system to be disabled for 
nearly five hours [33].  At the Browns Ferry nuclear power plant in 2006, a “Data Storm” 
spike in traffic caused a PLC to crash, resulting in the failure of recirculation pumps and 
forcing a manual reactor shutdown [42].  Most notably, the recent Stuxnet virus targeted 
specific operating characteristics to create direct physical consequences [22]. 
ICS networks are connected to the Internet despite known risks.  Leverett 
discovered 10,358 ICS related devices connected to the Internet through a search over a 
two year period from 2009-2011 [43].  Leverett used a total of 33 queries to find over 
10,000 devices using an open source search engine, SHODAN.  He also used Google’s 
geocoding service to locate the devices by the latitude and longitude using the country, 
city name, and country code.  Of the devices discovered, only 17 percent implemented 
any type of authentication [21]. 
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ICS networks require constant integrity and availability.  ICS network engineers 
typically have not considered confidentiality because the networks were primarily air 
gapped.  Integrity is important because valid traffic is necessary to ensure that a device is 
operating within normal operating parameters.  Availability is also very important 
because the systems are responsible for critical services that require optimal uptime.   
A primary shortfall in ICS security is the lack of ability to monitor and detect 
malicious events at the field device level.  PLCs have little memory, hard drive space, or 
processing power and are not designed to execute additional applications. As a result, 
there are minimal security mechanisms designed specifically for the ICS environment.  
The lack of early attack indicators and logging capabilities impedes identification of 
attacks and the ability to perform forensics if a system is compromised.   
Encountered in many ICS networks are legacy system devices.  It is not abnormal 
for a system to be in use for 30 years in a traditional ICS network [19].  Many of these 
systems must be in operation 100% of the time, so they cannot be taken offline for 
system upgrades even when a security hole has been discovered.  These systems are 
typically left vulnerable for many years without replacement or upgrades.   
ICS security has to deal with the challenge of bridging the gap between 
Information Technology (IT) experts who know the traditional security solutions and the 
engineers that configure ICS networks.  IT experts are typically concerned about security 
in the enterprise networks and the engineers are concerned about system availability and 
functionality [19]. 
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2.6 ICS Security Mechanisms  
There is a need to develop and implement a more robust security mechanism for 
ICS networks.  Digital Bond has developed an IDS signature package for four different 
control system protocols [7].  The signatures are able to defend against known attacks, 
malformed protocol requests and rarely used commands.  There is a need to discover 
previously unknown attacks to create additional signatures for the IDS.  Note that the IDS 
is designed for the perimeter network layer and not the field device layer.   
Another research team, Morris and Pavurapu [27], established a bump-in-the-wire 
device that is placed in a network to encrypt, analyze, and log each network packet.  This 
device is able to defend against response injection, command injection, and denial of 
service on a control system.  This inline system introduces the risk of compromising 
availability of the systems it is protecting if it goes offline. 
 Many of the ICS security developments work to incorporate in a layer of 
encryption.  Balitanas et al. [1] look to add in a crossed-cipher scheme to increase 
security through encryption with reduced delay in the system compared to IT encryption 
techniques.  The authors note that there are significant challenges when implementing 
cryptography because of the time requirements of ICS systems and the time delay added 
by encryption, decryption and processing time. Unfortunately, this solution would have to 
be built into all devices and adds additional latency counter to requirements of real time 
environments.   
Other secure ICS architectures are described by Pal et al. [31].  The authors take 
into account the limitations of limited computational capacity, limited space capacity, 
low bandwidth and real-time processing.  The architectures discussed each have their 
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own advantages of key storage and distribution among field devices.  Each of the 
architectures requires a different number of keys to be stored at the field device layer 
depending if the field devices need to communicate between each other. 
 There are currently inline solutions that have been created such as the EtherGuard 
Encryptor developed by Ultra Electronics [41].  These products offer a way to help 
increase security; however, if these devices are inline and fail they will disrupt the 
availability of the overall system.  Additionally, these devices introduce latency in the 
network traffic that may be detrimental to the need to operate in a real-time environment 
[19]. 
 Stouffer’s Guide to ICS Security [39] recommends integrating security into 
networks through network segregation.  The first recommendation is to keep the ICS 
system air-gapped from the corporate network.  However, Leverett [21] has shown that 
many networks are connected to the Internet with or without the network administrator’s 
knowledge.  Stouffer also presents multiple firewall models to create network segregation 
if the network must be connected to the Internet.  These models include: a dual-homed 
machine (i.e., a system connected to both the controlled ICS network and the corporate 
network), firewall between the corporate and ICS networks, a firewall and router between 
the corporate and ICS networks, a firewall with a demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the 
corporate and ICS networks and two firewalls between corporate and ICS networks.   
Stouffer notes that firewalls are not the best solution but that the firewalls do provide an 
effective baseline level of security. 
 Remote forensics on ICS networks has been demonstrated by Chavez et al. [3] 
when they showed that Encase Enterprise can be used to perform forensics on ICS 
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networks.  Test results from this research demonstrate the feasibility of conducting 
forensics on a field device without disrupting normal operations. 
2.7 Network Attack 
 Skoudis describes a five step process for attacking a network: Reconnaissance, 
Scanning, Gaining Access, Maintaining Access and Covering Tracks and Hiding [37].  
Reconnaissance requires discovering as much about a target as possible.  Attackers use 
common fingerprinting mechanisms to find the machine they are attempting to 
compromise.  SHODAN, for example, allows an intruder to perform reconnaissance to 
find a device vulnerable to an attack.  The next step, scanning, occurs when an attacker 
knows IP addresses of targeted systems and involves scanning to find potential 
vulnerabilities.  A common tool used for scanning systems to find more information 
about the device is Nmap.  Nmap determines which ports are open and potentially 
vulnerable to attack.  The next step, gaining access, is when the attacker uses an exploit 
against a vulnerability to gain access to the system.  There are many exploit databases or 
tools that an attacker can consult to get a description of an exploit or to launch an 
automated attack.  Once the attacker has access they use a Trojan Horse or add a 
backdoor on the system to maintain the access.  Once the attacker knows that they are 
able to maintain access on a system, they cover their tracks by installing rootkits, 
modifying logs, creating hidden files and establishing cover channels. 
2.7.1 Fingerprinting 
Fingerprinting is a standard technique used to identify the OS running on the 
target system.  In control systems, fingerprinting is used to find the make and model of 
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field devices [9].  In the reconnaissance and scanning phases of network attack, 
fingerprinting of ICS field devices is performed in a variety of ways.  There are four 
identifiable elements on most field devices: known set of open ports through port scans, 
known behavior of services through banner grabbing, Ethernet header manufacturer tags 
and known MAC address space.  Through the combination and correlation of these items, 
a fingerprint can be produced for a field device. 
2.7.1.1 Port Scan 
  Most PLCs operate on a select set of proprietary ports.  Allen Bradley 
devices, for example, run a proprietary protocol, Ethernet IP, over port 44818.  If the 
device is scanned and port 44818 is determined open, an attacker could conclude that the 
device has a likelihood of being an Allen Bradley device.  If a port scan identifies a 
particular set of open ports, it is likely that the device is from a specific vendor.  Devices 
that communicate Modbus TCP have TCP port 502 open.  Once an attacker discovers 
open ports they are able to further fingerprint the device using banner grabbing 
techniques. 
2.7.1.2 Banner Grabbing 
  A device can be correctly identified through banner grabbing via known 
responses on open ports.  The SHODAN system, used by Leverett during his research, 
was able to compile a list of responses from banner grabs against open ports on devices.  
Banner grabbing on web servers is very common because many times information 
obtained corresponds to a company that manufactures the device. 
 Modbus designated port 502 is also susceptible to banner grabbing.  The Modbus 
TCP protocol makes it mandatory to incorporate the Encapsulated Interface Transport 
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function with the Modbus Encapsulated Interface type Read Device Identification.  This 
function allows any Modbus TCP connection to read very critical information about the 
device.  The mandatory objects that must be defined are vendor name, product code and 
major/minor revision.  The information returned from those three objects identify the 
exact device and firmware. 
2.7.1.3 Ethernet Manufacturer Tags 
  Digital Bond discusses how some devices have manufacturer specific tags 
in the Ethernet header of response packets from field devices [9].  This field is placed as a 
Ethernet trailer used to designate that the traffic is to a specific device.  
2.7.1.4 MAC address 
 The last piece that can be used to fingerprint a field device is the MAC 
address space of the vendor.  Each manufacturer of Ethernet enabled devices is assigned 
a MAC address range which can be used to determine the vendor of the device if the 
fingerprinting is done on a local segment. 
2.8 Emulation 
 Emulation is software or hardware that allows one system to imitate the behavior 
of another system.  This phenomenon is very common in the IT sector with the 
development of honeypots.  A honeypot is a closely monitored computing resource that is 
intended to be probed, attacked or compromised.  More precisely, a honeypot is “an 
information system resource whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of the 
resource” [38].  Honeypot technology has been around for many years on the Internet but 
only recently has it been introduced in the ICS community.  Honeypots were first 
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discussed, in 1990, with the book Clifford Stoll’s The Cuckoo’s Egg and Bill Cheswick’s 
“An Evening With Berferd”; the first honeypot was deployed in 1997 [38].   
Honeypots are an effective way to detect intruders and to gather malware samples 
to create signatures to prevent future attacks.  Honeypots add value to the security of a 
system by detecting and logging threats and allowing mitigations of such attacks.  In a 
honeypot, an inbound connection implies the system is being scanned or attacked.  This is 
the case because honeypots are intended to be dormant with no legitamate traffic sent to 
the devices.  Outbound connections usually represent a compromise of the system 
because honeypots are configured not to send traffic on the network. 
2.8.1 Honeypot Overview 
There are two types of honeypots: production and research honeypots.  Each 
honeypot type operates in the same manner but are used for different objectives.  
Research honeypots are used to gather malware for further analysis and creation of 
detection signatures.  Production honeypots add to the overall security posture of an 
organization by detecting attacks and mitigating the risk of attackers [38].  Mitigating the 
risk is done through many different means such as blocking inbound connections from 
the specific IP address.   
 Honeypots mainly consists of two variations: low-interaction and high-interaction 
honeypots.  Low-interaction honeypots consists of emulated services and operating 
systems which provide targets.  These honeypots are easily fingerprinted as they only 
emulate the basic services.  High-interaction honeypots provide real systems applications 
and services for the attacker to interact with.  High-interaction honeypots are difficult to 
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set up because they need to be secure enough so an attacker cannot use the machine to 
attack other machines in the network [38].   
2.8.2 Advantages of Honeypots 
 Honeypots afford advantages including valuable data, resources, simplicity and 
return on investment [15].  The first advantage is the value in the data collected.  
Honeypots only collect data when interacted with, making the data much more 
manageable to analyze than traditional network logging systems.  Additionally, 
honeypots reduce the amount of false positives because any interactions indicate 
unauthorized traffic.  Honeypots are able to detect many more attacks because any 
activity in the honeypot is an irregularity which makes novel attacks easier to identify.  
This is more effective than alternatives that use signatures which require previous 
identification of the attack. 
 Honeypots require minimal resources for employment.  Honeypots can be set up 
on aging computers because they have little interactions and typically do not have to deal 
with resource exhaustion.  Even large networks only require one or two systems to 
monitor any kind of attack on the network. 
 Honeypots are also very simplistic.  One does not have to keep up with signature 
sets or rule sets; someone just needs to place the honeypot somewhere in the network and 
then wait for the attack.  Some honeypots are more complex but all follow the same 
simple premise: if something interacts with the honeypot it is ilegitimate communication 
and needs to be examined [38].  
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 The last advantage to honeypots is the return on investment.  Honeypots are cost 
effective because of minimal resource requirements.  Honeypots also demonstrate that if 
it has been attacked that someone has been able to infiltrate the network [38].   
2.8.3 Disadvantages of Honeypots 
 While honeypots have many advantages, they also have disadvantages.  The first 
disadvantage is that they have a narrow field of view.  Honeypots only see what traffic is 
directed at the honeypot.  If the attack is never directed at the honeypot it will never 
detect the attack.   
 Honeypots are also susceptible to fingerprinting.  Fingerprinting occurs when an 
attacker can identify the true identity of the honeypot because of certain characteristics or 
behaviors [38].  If the attacker can correctly identify the honeypot, he can avoid it when 
attacking the network.  While uncommon, fingerprinting can also be done if the 
programming of the honeypot has misspelled a word somewhere which alerts an attacker 
when the response is sent back to the attacker. 
 The last disadvantage is the risk that a honeypot introduces into the network.  
While the amount of risk each type of honeypot introduces into the environment is 
different, the risk is still present.  Once a honeypot has been attacked and compromised it 
can be used to attack, infiltrate or harm other computer systems in the organization or 
other organizations [15]. 
2.8.4 Honeypot Attributes 
 There are three fundamental requirements of honeypots: data control, data capture 
and data analysis.  The first, data control, is used for mitigation of risk through the 
containment of the activity of the attacker.  This is accomplished by controlling what an 
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attacker is able to do once on the honeypot.  Note that it is important to make sure that 
once the honeypot is compromised, another system cannot be compromised by it.  A 
common way to do this is with a fail-safe that prevents all outbound connections from the 
honeypot once compromised.   Honeypots should also alert when a system has been 
compromised to notify an administrator of the event.   
 Data capture is the next fundamental requirement which includes logging and 
auditing functions.  The most common way to collect the data is with a layer two bridge 
that collects any traffic that has been directed to or from the honeypot.  Note that nothing 
should be stored on the local honeypot machine to prevent fingerprinting information for 
the honeypot to the attacker. 
 The last requirement is data analysis which is the synthesis of information 
gathered from the honeypot.  If multiple honeypots are implemented across a large 
network spanning multiple time zones the information needs to be standardized and have 
synchronized time stamping to correlate the data.  This is important for analyzing the 
attack methods to ensure continuity between collection methods [15], [16].  
2.8.5 Honeypot Technology in IT 
 There are many different solutions developed for the IT sector.  The following set 
of solutions are indicative of current honeypots in IT.  The first solution in the IT sector is 
honeynets.  A honeynet is a “high-interaction honeypot designed to capture extensive 
information on threats “[16]. A honeynet is an architecture with multiple, networked 
honeypots.  Each of the honeypots in the network can be different systems ranging from 
Windows workstations to IIS web servers to Cisco routers.  Honeynets rely on the same 
basic principles that honeypots follow in that they are not productions systems so that any 
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communication with these systems is considered malicious.  In the paper “Know Your 
Enemy: Honeynets [16]” The Honeynet Project states:  
“In many ways a honeynet is like a fishbowl. You create an environment 
where you can watch everything happening inside it. However, instead of putting 
rocks, coral, and sea weed in your fish bowl, you put Linux DNS servers, HP 
printers, and Juniper routers in your honeynet architecture. Just as a fish interacts 
with the elements in your fishbowl, intruders interact with your honeypots”[16].   
Figure 2.4 shows an example of a typical network configuration of a honeynet.  The most 
critical component to a honeynet is a Honeywall. 
 A Honeywall is a transparent bridge that is setup to enable data capture, data 
control and data analysis.  Honeywall is configured with three interfaces, two for the 
Figure 2.4: Network setup for Honeynet [16]. 
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transparent bridge and one for management.  A transparent bridge has no IP address so all 
the traffic passes promiscuously through the device.  The third interface is configured for 
th management network to enable remote control of the Honeywall.  Honeywall limits 
malware damage by implementing a fencelist (i.e., a list of IP’s for non-target computers 
which honeypots on the LAN cannot communicate with).  Honeywall uses snort-inline 
[23] as an intrusion protection system to prevent attackers from sending known exploits 
to other machines once the machine is compromised.  The number of connections out is 
typically filtered from the Honeywall to prevent too much activity once the box has been 
compromised.  Honeywall also uses the monitoring system Sebek [35]. 
 Sebek is a client-server data capture tool which closely monitors and logs all user 
activity.  Sebek replaces several common system calls which can then observe all 
accessed data [35].  Sebek is a kernel-level rootkit which hooks and replaces common 
calls.  Sebek has the following capabilities: record keystrokes of a session that is using 
encryption, recover files copied with SCP, capture passwords used to log in to remote 
Figure 2.5: Typical Sebek deployment [14]. 
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system, recover passwords used to enable Burneye protected binaries and accomplish 
many other forensics related tasks [14].   In Figure 2.5, the client module is installed on 
the honeypot A.  The attacker’s activity captured by the honeypot is then sent to the 
network and passively collected by the server (Honeywall Gateway).  Sebek data is not 
stored on the target, but rather transmitted via UDP to the sniffing honeywall or 
designated log server.  Packets are masked from the attacker, even if a sniffer is run on 
the target through the use of a special Kernel module created to interact directly with the 
network device driver instead of using the TCP/IP stack [14].  
 Honeyd is another common honeypot solution.  Honeyd is an open source low-
interaction virtual honeypot.  Honeyd has the capability to simulate thousands of virtual 
systems on one single physical system.  Figure 2.6 shows a sample configuration of 
honeyd.  Honeyd is able to provide arbitrary services, via a configuration file, that 
interact with an attacker.  Honeyd simulates each operating system at the TCP/IP level  
which provides honeyd the ability to deceive Nmap into believing the virtual honeypot is 
an actual operating system.   
Figure 2.6: Sample configuration of Honeyd [35]. 
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2.9 Honeypots in ICS 
 Honeypots are useful in ICS networks to help improve the overall security 
posture.  Today there is no nominal way to detect malware running on PLCs.  Consider 
the case of Stuxnet which was on the PLCs for a year before being detected [10].  Indeed, 
a honeypot for ICS would help identify malware currently in ICS networks and an ability 
to study any future malware.   
Honeypots aid in the overall security posture through prevention, detection and 
response.  Honeypots help with prevention by acting as an early warning of an attack.  A 
honeypot generates an alert for any connection allowing an administrator to block the IP 
address and prevent the user from attacking any other machines.  Some honeypots use 
deception or deterrence to prevent attackers from further attempts to attack the system.  
Deception involves making the attacker waste time on a honeypot that has no value and 
deter them from trying to attack production machines.  Deterrence is used when the 
honeypot is coded to inform the attacker that the box they are interacting with is a 
honeypot in an attempt to dissuade them from attacking the network any further.   
 Honeypots also add to ICS security posture through detection.  Honeypots are an 
effective way at detecting attacks through reducing false positives, false negatives and 
through data aggregation.  The last way that honeypots add to the overall ICS security 
posture is through response.  Honeypots collect all the data to and from the system so the 
data necessary to respond to an incident can be retrieved by the incident responder.  The 
honeypot can also be taken offline for further analysis without affecting production 
systems [38].     
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 There are many IT solutions currently developed; however, these solutions are not 
readily applicable to ICS networks.  The IT honeypots are not effective because the cost 
of solutions to disseminate across ICS is too high.  Additionally, solutions that place a 
honeypot in line with a production device creates a point of failure which could disrupt 
the availability that is critical to ICS networks.  Current IT solutions are also not 
applicable to ICS networks due to the nonstandard communication protocols.      
2.9.1 Current Honeypots in ICS 
 Even with the current landscape and challenges, some solutions have been 
proposed for ICS networks.  The first solution is a SCADA Honeynet that was started in 
2004 utilizing Honeyd, simulating a limited set of services from a popular PLC [32].  The 
goals of this project were to create a framework to simulate a variety of industrial 
networks on a single Linux host running honeyd (e.g., minimal Modbus TCP functions, 
FTP, Telnet, and web server).  These servers are only basic simulations and offer a 
limited number of functions to interact with.  The work is no longer maintained; however, 
a follow on was initiated by Digital Bond.   
 The work by Digital Bond utilizes two separate virtual machines.  One of the 
virtual machines is a modified Honeywall which implements Digital Bond SCADA IDS 
signatures to detect malicious attacks against the second virtual machine [8].  This is an 
efficient tool that can also be used in line with a physical device as well.  Note that this 
introduces latency and could fail causing communication to the physical device to fail.  
The second virtual machine is a simulated PLC that exposes a number of services to an 
attacker [8].  Digital Bond implements Modbus TCP protocol, FTP server, Telnet, HTTP 
and SNMP servers.   These services are much like the other project in that they only 
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simulate the banner for the different protocols and minimal basic functions.  Figure 2.7 
shows the configuration of the two virtual machines from Digital Bond.  
These solutions are both efficient solutions but are only designed for a particular 
PLC or particular protocol.  The solutions require more modularity to allow expansion 
into the majority of protocols and devices in ICS networks.  
2.9.2 Emulation Requirements 
ICS honeypots have extra challenges associated because of the variety of ICS 
networks.  There are many manufacturers of PLCs, differing protocols, and system-
specific configurations for ICS networks.  This makes it challenging for a single 
honeypot solution to emulate a variety of systems.  Additionally, each PLC has different 
field devices ranging from sensors to valves.  As a result, each PLC has a different 
configuration to control each of these field devices.   
Figure 2.7: SCADA Honeynet configuration [8]. 
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 When a honeypot detects a new attack, an analyst can analyze it to create a 
signature to input into the IDS to prevent the attack in the future [18].  This idea is 
restated by the Department of Energy when they provided the “21 Steps to Improve 
Cyber Security of SCADA Networks.”  Number eight in the list is to implement internal 
and external IDS and establish 24-hour-a-day incident monitoring [4].   
2.10 Summary 
 This chapter explains ICS, critical infrastructure protection, emulation and the 
current technology surrounding honeypots.  It details current ICS honeypots and short 
comings with the current technology.  ICS honeypots need to be modularized and allow 
easy reconfiguration.  This chapter demonstrate the necessity for additional security in 
ICS networks and how current IT solutions are not capable of protecting the vastly 
different ICS networks.  The next chapter discusses the methodology used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the ICS honeypot created as part of this research. 
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III. Methodology 
 This chapter discusses the methodology for evaluating an emulated PLC to 
determine if the device responds to basic network traffic and can avoid common 
fingerprinting techniques.  Successful emulation of a PLC utilizing Modbus TCP traffic 
is contingent upon the device (1) correctly responding to standard traffic, (2) avoiding 
being fingerprinted as a Linux machine using common ICS fingerprinting techniques and 
(3) correctly handling invalid traffic.   
3.1 Problem Definition 
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis 
 The goal of this research is to include attack detection within Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) at the field device level through development of an inexpensive, 
configurable and portable emulation device that contains logging capabilities.   
 It is expected that the emulated PLC responds according to RFC standards with 
any user that may try to interact with it directly.  It is expected that the device responds to 
all traffic sent to the device in a valid manner and be able to log all interactions with the 
emulated PLC.  It is also expected to respond as an operational PLC to common ICS 
fingerprinting techniques (i.e., Port Scan, MAC Address, and Banner Grabbing). 
3.1.2 Approach 
 This research determines the effectiveness of the emulated PLC at emulating an 
operational PLC.  Allen Bradley PLCs are used as a baseline for fingerprinting tests and 
invalid traffic tests while the Modbus TCP RFC is used as the baseline for standard 
traffic response tests.  The emulated PLC is evaluated to see how responses compare with 
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the baseline and if the interaction is logged.  The emulated PLC and Allen Bradley PLCs 
are subjected to a variety of tests outlined in Section 3.3 to determine if the devices 
respond in the appropriate manner with the corresponding baseline.  Analysis of the 
results is examined to determine the effectiveness of the emulated PLC at detecting 
traffic on ICS.  Additionally, a qualitative analysis using Air Force ICS assessors is used 
to provide a notional evaluation of the effectiveness of emulating an operational PLC. 
3.2 Environment 
Figure 3.1 shows the environment used for the following experiments.  The HMI 
is a Windows 7 64 bit SP1 machine running Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness, 
Nmap and Wireshark.  Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness is a package that has 
been designed to test PLC devices to determine if they conform to protocol standards.  
The HMI has a 500GB hard drive with 4GB of memory.  The PLCs are a factory install 
of an Allen Bradley Micrologix 1100 and an Allen Bradley CompactLogix 1769.  The 
Figure 3.1: Network diagram. 
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emulated PLC is an Overo Earth COM Gumstix.  Gumstix is a mini computer, not 
surprisingly, about the size of a stick of gum (see the bottom of  Figure 3.2).  It runs a 
Linux based platform using the Open Embedded framework and costs approximately 
$200 [12]. The Gumstix board has an ARM Cortex-A8 CPU, 512MB of flash memory 
and 512MB of RAM with a microSD card slot to be used as non-volatile storage.  In the 
case of this research, an 8GB microSD card is used.   Gumstix computers leverage 
expansion boards to extend IO capabilities to a range of operations (e.g., GPS, bluetooth, 
and 802.11 wireless).  For this research, the Tobi-Duo expansion board (shown in the top 
of Figure 3.2) is incorporated to provide a dual NIC configuration allowing a primary 
NIC for ICS communication and another NIC for out-of-band logging.  The Gumstix 
Overo CPU board snaps onto the Tobi-Duo expansion board for quick connection.  The 
operating system is Linux 2.6.34 built and installed on the device. Appendix A provides 
Figure 3.2: Representative Gumstix device. 
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the steps required to build the emulated PLC. The logging device is an Ubuntu 11.10 
Machine with a 120GB hard drive with 2GB of memory running syslog server capturing 
the logging entries sent from the emulated PLC.  The systems are connected with CAT5e 
cable which supports up to 100MB/s connection.  Figure 3.1 shows that both the 
emulated PLC and the Allen Bradley PLCs communicate directly with the HMI.  The 
figure depicts that the emulated PLC can sit in a network next to any vendor specific 
device (e.g., Siemens, Omron, Allen Bradley).  For testing purposes, however, the PLCs 
that are connected to the switch are an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1100 and an Allen 
Bradley ControlLogix 1769.  The emulated PLC also communicates with the data 
logging device through logs sent out the secondary NIC.   
3.3 Evaluation Technique 
3.3.1 Functionality Test through Modbus Traffic Emulation  
 The Modbus traffic test cases are used to verify the ability of the emulated PLC to 
communicate in accordance with Modbus RFC standards.  Although there are numerous 
Modbus TCP standard function codes, the most commonly used include: 
 Read Coil 
 Write Coil 
 Read Discrete Inputs 
 Read Holding Registers 
 Write Holding Register 
 Read Input Registers   
 
 Each of the function codes listed above is sent in accordance with Triangle 
MicroWorks and Modbus Poll evaluation process to the emulated PLC in order to verify 
proper responses.  The commands are sent in the order shown above with thirty seconds 
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in between each packet being transmitted.  Note that the focus of these tests is to evaluate 
operational functionality; analysis on traffic rate limits is recommended for future work.  
The following two software packages are used to test the emulated PLC against the traffic 
standard: 
1. Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness 
2. Modbus Poll 
Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness is a software package created to test if a 
device adheres to the Request for Comments (RFC) for a given protocol.  This checks the 
response packets bytes to make sure that the packet is a valid packet.  If the packet is 
valid the Test Harness logs each response received, and if the packet is invalid the Test 
Harness times out waiting for a valid response.  Modbus Poll is a free software package 
created to communicate with Modbus enabled devices.  This software is also used to 
communicate with the emulated PLC to see if the responses are considered valid.   
The following steps outline how to complete each test case.  First, the emulated 
PLC is attached to the switch and the logging device using CAT5 cables.  After the 
device is turned on and both Ethernet NICs have been initialized then, SSH is initiated 
from the logging device to the emulated PLC.  The command ‘ifconfig’ is run to 
determine the IP address of the emulated PLC.  Next, the command ‘ps –ef’ is run and 
then viewed to make sure that both tcpdump and the python script are initiated.  On the 
HMI, Wireshark is started to capture the network traffic to and from the emulated PLC.  
The software indicated in the test case (i.e., Triangle MicroWorks or Modbus Poll) is 
then started, and each of the six most popular Modbus TCP commands listed above are 
initiated by the software.  After the six commands conclude, the software and Wireshark 
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are stopped and the capture saved for analysis.  An SSH session is then initialized to the 
emulated PLC and the pcap created from tcpdump is retrieved.  The syslog on the logging 
machine is also saved.  The emulated PLC is then restarted to make a consistent starting 
point for each test.  
The emulated PLC is successful if the program used for testing is able to receive a 
valid response from the device.  The traffic is analyzed to see if the Modbus Wireshark 
dissector is able to determine that the traffic being sent from the emulated PLC is 
Modbus TCP.  The test is not successful if the device does not respond in an expected 
manner.   
The emulated PLC must keep state as part of the functionality such that if a coil is 
turned from off to on, subsequent reads indicate the coil is now turned on.  This test is 
successful if a second Read Coil response shows the coil has transitioned status.  The test 
is unsuccessful if the response to the second Read Coil shows that the coil did not 
transition state.  
3.3.2 Fingerprinting Test Cases 
3.3.2.1 Port Scan Test Case 
The intent of the emulated PLC is to act as an operational PLC and avoid being 
fingerprinted as a Linux device.  The most common way to detect a device is through 
port scanning with a tool such as Nmap.  Nmap is run to scan the device for open ports 
but can also attempt to determine the operating system (OS) that the device is running.  In 
the Port Scan Test Cases the following devices are scanned: 
1. Emulated PLC 
2. Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1100 
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3. Allen Bradley ControlLogic 1769 
These scans determine if it is possible to fingerprint the device as an emulated PLC 
through scanning and examining the results against the scans of two Allen Bradley 
devices that are configured to communicate over Ethernet/IP (port 44818).  The Allen 
Bradley devices do not communicate over Modbus TCP so the devices do not have port 
502 open as the emulated PLC; however, they do have a standard ICS communication 
protocol (Ethernet/IP port 44818) that is open in the same manner as the Modbus port for 
the emulated PLC.   
The following outlines how to complete each test case.  First the emulated PLC is 
connected to the switch and the logging device.  Both Allen Bradley devices are 
connected to the switch with Ethernet cables.  After the emulated PLC is turned on and 
both Ethernet NICs have initialized then SSH is initiated from the logging device to the 
emulated PLC.  The command ‘ifconfig’ is run to determine the IP address of the 
emulated PLC.  Next, the command ‘ps -ef’ is run and then the results are viewed to 
make sure that both tcpdump and the python script are initiated.  On the HMI, Wireshark 
is initialized on the Ethernet port to capture the network traffic to and from the emulated 
PLC and Allen Bradley Devices.  Nmap is also initialized on the HMI.  An Intense Scan 
including all TCP ports is done against each of the devices listed above.  After the Nmap 
scan has completed Wireshark is stopped.  The Wireshark and Nmap captures are saved 
for analysis.  After the scan of the emulated PLC an SSH session is initialized to the 
emulated PLC and the pcap created from tcpdump is retrieved.  The syslog on the logging 
machine is also saved.  Another scan of the Allen Bradley devices is also accomplished to 
run the OS detection scan against just the ICS communication port and one closed port 
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(e.g. <IP address> -O -p 44818-44819).  The emulated PLC does not currently implement 
a web server so the second Nmap scan provides a closer representation of what the 
emulated PLC results should look like.  Future work includes implementation of a web 
server on the emulated PLC to provide a closer representation of modern PLCs. 
The Nmap scan on the emulated PLC is successful if only the ICS communication 
port, TCP port 502, appears to be open.  If the OS scan on the emulated PLC results are 
the same as that of the OS scan specifically targeting the open ICS communication port 
on the Allen Bradley devices then the test is considered successful.  The test is not 
successful if the OS on the emulated PLC is not the same as the Allen Bradley devices. 
3.3.2.2 MAC Address Resolution Test Case 
MAC Address Resolution is a common fingerprinting technique common to ICS 
field devices.  The emulated PLC is tested to verify that the MAC address resolves to a 
known ICS vendor.  The Wireshark traffic from both the Modbus Traffic Emulation test 
cases and the Nmap scan are examined to see if the MAC address resolves to a known 
ICS vendor.  The results of the Nmap scan are also examined to see if the MAC address 
resolves to a known ICS vendor. 
The MAC Address Resolution succeeds if the MAC addresses in all the 
Wireshark captures are the same and resolve to a known ICS vendor.  The MAC address 
must also resolve in the Nmap scan to succeed.  The MAC Address Resolution fails if in 
any of the captures the MAC address does not indicate a known ICS vendor MAC 
address. 
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3.3.2.3 Banner Grabbing Test Case 
Banner Grabbing is another fingerprinting technique common to ICS field 
devices.  This test case tests that the emulated PLC can respond to banner grabbing 
request on the Modbus TCP port.  The following states how to configure the emulated 
PLC for this test case.  First the emulated PLC is connected to the switch and the logging 
device.  After the device is turned on and both Ethernet NICs have been initialized then 
SSH is initiated from the logging computer to the emulated PLC.  The command 
‘ifconfig’ is run to determine the IP address of the emulated PLC.  Next, the command 
‘ps -ef’ is run and then the results are viewed to make sure that both tcpdump and the 
python script have initiated.  On the HMI, Wireshark is started on the Ethernet port to 
capture the network traffic to and from the emulated PLC.  Triangle MicroWorks 
Protocol Test Harness is then started on the HMI.  The Modbus TCP command Device 
ID is then sent to banner grab the information from the emulated PLC.  This command 
helps to correctly identify a device because the response sends information such as the 
vender name and product name.  Note that this command is a Modbus command and 
therefore cannot be run against either of the Allen Bradley devices.  After the command 
has completed, Triangle MicroWorks and Wireshark are stopped.  The Wireshark capture 
is saved for analysis.  An SSH session is initialized to the emulated PLC and the .pcap 
created from tcpdump is retrieved.  The syslog on the logging machine is also saved.   
The banner grabbing on the emulated PLC is successful if Triangle MicroWorks 
is able to receive a valid response from the emulated PLC.  Successful emulation of this 
command gives another way that an attack can fingerprint the emulated PLC as an 
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operational PLC.  The test is not successful if the device does not respond in a manner 
that Triangle MicroWorks is expecting.  
3.3.3 Invalid Traffic Test Cases 
This test is used to make sure that when an invalid packet is received by the 
emulated PLC it responds in the same manner as an operational PLC.  This test 
incorporates the emulated PLC and both the Allen Bradley devices. 
The devices are configured as in Section 3.3.2.1 Port Scan.  The only difference is 
that Scapy is started on the HMI to allow for the creation of an invalid TCP packet to be 
sent to each of the devices.  Scapy sends an invalid SYN packet with a NULL TCP 
checksum and then waits for a response.  After 60 seconds Scapy then sends a valid SYN 
packet verifying that the device is responsive.  After Scapy has completed sending the 
packets Wireshark is stopped.  The Wireshark capture is saved for analysis.  After the 
invalid traffic to the emulated PLC has completed an SSH session is initialized to the 
emulated PLC and the .pcap created from tcpdump is retrieved.  The syslog is also saved 
for analysis. 
The invalid traffic test case on the emulated PLC is successful if the response 
from the emulated PLC matches that of the Allen Bradley devices.  The test is not 
successful if the device does not respond in a similar manner to that of the Allen Bradley 
devices.  This test is emulating a standard IT practice of fingerprinting a device through 
responses received to certain invalid packets. 
3.3.4 Logging Capabilities 
Logging on the emulated PLC is important to be able to capture any interaction 
that an attack may have with the emulated PLC.  The logging of the emulated PLC is 
 41 
tested in the Modbus traffic emulation, port scan, banner grabbing and invalid traffic tests 
as described above.  For each of the tests the number of packets captured on the emulated 
PLC are compared to the number of packets captured on the HMI.  The syslog on the 
logging device is also checked for each test to see if each of the commands sent to the 
emulated PLC are correctly logged. 
The logging of the emulated PLC is successful if both of the following conditions 
are met: (1) the number of packets captured on the emulated PLC match the number of 
packets sent from the HMI and (2) each of the commands sent to the emulated PLC are 
correctly logged. 
3.3.5 Qualitative Evaluation 
A qualitative analysis is conducted through work with a member of the Air 
National Guard’s 262nd Network Warfare Squadron.  The 262nd is based at McChord Air 
Force Base outside Tacoma, Washington and attracts people from many tech companies 
such as Microsoft, Cisco Systems and Adobe Systems.  A member of this unit analyzed 
the emulated PLC for fingerprinting techniques.  The 262
nd
 does ICS assessments on Air 
Force networks which gives them the capability of comparing the emulated PLC to 
operational devices.   
The emulated PLC is provided to one of the members of the Air National Guard’s 
262
nd
.  The member uses their available testing environment and techniques for the 
evaluation.  The evaluation is considered successful if the member reports that the 
emulated PLC is not distinguishable from an operational device.  Note that specific 
techniques used to evaluate this device are not considered important; the goal is to see if 
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an experienced assessor determines the emulated PLC is consistent with an operational 
PLC. 
3.4 Methodology Summary 
 This chapter provided the methodology for evaluating the emulated PLC.  The 
Modbus traffic emulation of the emulated PLC is examined with: valid Modbus traffic, 
fingerprinting techniques and invalid traffic.  Modbus traffic is used to examine if the 
emulated PLC functionality is the same as that of an operational PLC.   Fingerprinting 
techniques are used to study the case of an attacker scanning the emulated PLC.  The 
invalid traffic is used to see if the emulated PLC is able to respond in the same manner as 
a PLC by other typical IT methods of fingerprinting.  These tests are all accomplished to 
simulate possible network traffic a device may receive when emulating a PLC.  During 
each of the tests, the logging capabilities are verified for capture on the emulated PLC as 
well as remote logging capabilities.  The qualitative analysis is conducted by an ICS 
security expert who is able to give an evaluation on how well the emulated PLC emulates 
an operational PLC. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 Results of this research are organized as the following: Section 4.1 discusses the 
development of the emulated PLC. Section 4.2 describes the emulated PLC initialization 
checks prior to running the test. Section 4.3 presents the results from the functionality 
checks with valid Modbus Traffic, fingerprinting techniques, invalid TCP traffic, logging 
capabilities and the qualitative evaluation given by a subject matter expert. Section 4.4 is 
the analysis of the results given in Section 4.3, and Section 4.5 summarizes all the results. 
4.1 Development of emulated PLC 
4.1.1 Architecture 
Device implementations for ICS field devices more closely resemble cell phones 
than traditional information technology platforms.  Indeed, there are myriad vendors, 
model numbers, configurations, chipsets and different operating systems/firmware for 
each associated device [36].  While the devices are quite unique in platform 
characteristics, PLCs that implement Modbus TCP conform to the RFC protocol 
specifications in order to enable inter-device communication.  Although the emulated 
PLC does not contain input/output functionality for analog and digital signals to control 
physical devices, it can be programmed to respond appropriately to Modbus 
communications.  For this research, the emulated PLC was programmed according to 
RFC specifications to incorporate common function codes identified in Chapter 3.   
The emulated PLC is incorporated into ICS operations similar to other PLC field 
devices.  Note that the emulated PLC can be readily modified to emulate various PLC 
vendors (e.g., Siemens, Omron, and Allen-Bradley).  PLC identification is determined by 
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MAC addresses assigned to the various vendors.  The emulated PLC can be set to 
respond with any MAC address such that if correlated, it resembles the associated vendor 
product.  Additionally, the emulated PLC incorporates an out-of-band logging capability 
to record and report on specified criteria (e.g., unexpected traffic patterns, attempt to 
read/write unauthorized parameters and unexpected function codes). 
4.1.2 Implementation Details 
The program that provides the emulation capability was developed using Python 
with the Scapy 2.2.0 module.  Additionally, tcpdump is implemented on the ICS-facing 
NIC to allow capture of network traffic and storage as pcap files.  Syslog is used to send 
alerts and traffic files to a remote logging device via the other NIC.  The emulated PLC is 
readily configurable to respond to operating parameters in the same manner as an 
operational PLC.  The emulated PLC maintains system state in the event that function 
parameters are modified.  For example, if a message is received to write to a single coil 
(e.g., close a valve) and a subsequent message requests a read for the same parameter 
(e.g., status of the valve), the emulation device will respond with the updated state (e.g., 
valve closed).  Additionally, if an unrecognized function code or transaction message is 
received, the emulated PLC responds with an appropriate unrecognized error code.  If 
traffic is received on a port other than the designated TCP port 502 (Modbus), the PLC 
emulation device responds with a simple RESET ACK; however, the action generates a 
logging event.  Such traffic may be indicative of a port scan. 
For logging purposes, any received traffic that is not consistent with pre-defined 
parameters generates an event.  Consider, for example, the configuration of the PLC 
emulation device to continually respond to read requests for various defined parameters. 
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The PLC emulation device is expecting to receive the message traffic precisely as 
specified; any traffic not conforming generates an event.  Alternatively, the PLC 
emulation device can be deployed to a segment without a specific configuration for 
expected message traffic.  In this scenario, the PLC emulation device serves as a 
traditional honeypot and can indicate attempts to scan the network for ICS devices. 
Emulating a traditional PLC for open ports is accomplished by implementing 
iptables to make all ports appear closed on the ICS-facing NIC, with the exception of port 
502.  The Scapy module generates packets from the PLC emulation device to craft 
messages consistent with Modbus standards.  Additionally, a startup script is included 
that changes the MAC address to a specified value to correspond with a PLC vendor.  
Banner grabbing is implemented for the Modbus TCP communication service emulated 
on TCP port 502.  For purposes of this research, replicating additional services to respond 
to banner grabbing or other identified fingerprinting techniques are not implemented. 
Future work for the PLC emulation device consists of developing such functionality. 
4.2 Emulated PLC Initialization Checks 
 Prior to sending traffic to the devices in the test cases, the emulated PLC is 
checked to validate that the necessary services are running.  The services required are as 
follows:  
 PLC emulation (canary.py) 
 Tcpdump  
 Network communications 
 Syslog 
The detailed steps for verifying services are as follows: 
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1. SSH connection is initiated from the logging device to the emulated PLC 
a. Run the command ps-ef 
i. Check the results and verify python and tcpdump are running 
2. A command window is opened on the HMI 
a. The command ping <IP address of emulated PLC> is initiated 
b. The command window is checked for a valid response 
c. The syslog on the logging device is then checked to confirm that the 
packet is recorded 
 For each test the emulated PLC successfully initialized and the processes 
correctly started. 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Functionality Test through Modbus Traffic Emulation 
The tests from the two software programs emulating Modbus TCP traffic 
demonstrate the emulated PLC conforms to RFC standards.  Table 4.1 shows that for 
each software package all six commands initiated by the test harness received valid 
responses. 
Table 4.1: Modbus TCP traffic tests. 
Software Messages Sent Valid Responses Invalid Responses 
Triangle MicroWorks 
Protocol Test Harness 
6 6 0 
Modbus Poll 6 6 0 
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The findings indicate that the responses of the emulated PLC conform to RFC 
standards for Modbus TCP.   Figure 4.1 shows the read coil response from the emulated 
PLC correctly dissected in Wireshark, indicating a valid response.  The correct dissection 
of the response in Wireshark further demonstrates that the response adheres to the RFC 
standard for Modbus TCP.  Figure 4.2 shows the statistics on Triangle MicroWorks 
denoting that all six responses are valid.  The Responses Received field identifies when 
the response is valid and conforms to RFC standards.  Requests Failed, Requests Timed 
Out, and Channel Errors indicate erroneous or invalid responses. 
 
Figure 4.2: Triangle MicroWorks response statistics. 
 
Figure 4.1: Read coil response Wireshark dissection. 
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The other tested functionality is the ability of the emulated PLC to maintain 
appropriate state.    Figure 4.3 shows the request and response of the traffic dissected in 
Triangle MicroWorks.  The first read shows that coil 1 is set to off (0).  The coil is then 
turned on (ff) and the status displays on (1) for the subsequent read.  The findings 
demonstrate the ability of the emulated PLC to update and maintain state. 
 The emulated PLC provides functionality for six Modbus commands according to 
the RFC standards.  The test used to evaluate the functionality of the six commands is 
consistent with industry standards used to evaluate an operational PLC before deploying 
to the field.  While only six commands are implemented in this iteration, incorporating 
additional commands is trivial. 
Figure 4.3: Read, Write, Read dissected in Triangle MicroWorks 
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4.3.2 Fingerprinting Techniques 
4.3.2.1 Port Scan 
The port scan using the software package Nmap identifies open ports and 
provides OS detection.  When the emulated PLC is scanned with the intense scan all TCP 
ports the results show TCP port 502 open and all other ports closed.  The results are 
indicative of a PLC device communicating Modbus on port 502.  Note that the Allen 
Bradley devices use Ethernet/IP as opposed to Modbus for ICS communication.  Scan 
results for both Allen Bradley devices similarly show a native ICS communication 
protocol Ethernet/IP on port 44818.   
For baseline purposes, an Nmap scan was performed against the Overo Gumstix 
with the Linux image and resulted in ports 22 and 111 open and an OS detection result of 
Tomato 1.27 (Linux 2.4.20).  The Overo Gumstix was then configured to the emulated 
PLC.  The OS detection results is ‘none’ because the results failed to match any operating 
systems in the Nmap OS database.  A similar scan for the Allen Bradley devices also 
resulted in ‘none’.  The scanning methodology is indicative of an attacker scanning a 
device to identify open communication ports and attempting to identify the OS to 
fingerprint a device prior to launching an exploit.  The findings demonstrate that an 
attacker scanning the emulated PLC with Nmap would infer the device to be an actual 
PLC due to the manner the emulated PLC responds consistent with a PLC 
communicating Modbus. 
4.3.2.2 MAC Address Resolution  
The MAC Address resolution test demonstrates the ability to mimic manufacturer 
device identifiers.  Figure 4.4 shows that the MAC address of the emulated PLC resolves 
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to a Siemens PLC when examined via Wireshark.  This is consistent with all traffic 
captures associated with the emulated PLC; in each test the MAC address appropriately 
resolved to a Siemens PLC. 
During the Nmap scan of the emulated PLC, the MAC address resolution, shown 
in Figure 4.5, also resolves to a Siemens Automation device.  With the OS scan coming 
back as negative an attacker examining the MAC address resolution and open ports likely 
concludes the device is indeed a PLC. 
 
Figure 4.5: Nmap MAC address resolution. 
4.3.2.3 Banner Grabbing 
The next common fingerprinting technique in ICS field devices is banner 
grabbing.  The Modbus TCP function code for Encapsulated Interface Transport-Device 
ID x43 x14, allows a user to retrieve information about a PLC, such as the vendor name 
and product code.  For the banner grabbing test, Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test 
Harness initiates the protocol messages.  Figure 4.6 demonstrates a successful response 
from the emulated PLC conforming to the RFC standard.  Figure 4.7 provides the values 
in detail for each of the three objects returned in response to the command.  Device object 
Figure 4.4: Read coil response Wireshark dissection. 
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zero is the vendor name, object 1 is the product code and object 2 is the major minor 
revision.  The Conformity Level means that the information is basic information about 
the PLC and the next object ID is only used if the information cannot be encapsulated in 
one packet.  The emulated PLC for the banner grabbing test is configured to appear to be 
an Allen Bradley, showing the adaptability of the emulated PLC to emulate multiple 
device types.  The results show the device is an Allen Bradley MicroLogix 1500 V1.12.1.   
 
Figure 4.6: Triangle MicroWorks response statistics for banner grab. 
 
Figure 4.7: Response to banner grab in Triangle MicroWorks. 
 Note that the banner grabbing is only tested for the Modbus protocol implementation.  
As services are added to the emulated PLC (e.g., web servers), the device requires 
evaluation of banner grabbing techniques for the service added. 
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4.3.3 Invalid ICS Traffic 
The emulated PLC was evaluated for the ability to handle invalid ICS traffic.  A 
SYN packet with an invalid checksum was sent to each of the PLC devices.  As 
demonstrated in Table 4.2, each device appropriately dropped the invalid packet.  
Appendix C.3 provides screen captures of the traffic in Wireshark for each device.  Note 
that there is no response to any of the request packets.  The second packet in each capture 
is a valid SYN packet followed by a response from each of the PLCs.  The results 
demonstrate that the device is functioning and checks for valid TCP checksums. 
Table 4.2: Response to valid/invalid TCP checksum. 
Device 
Response to Invalid 
Checksum 
Response to Valid 
Checksum 
Emulated PLC No Yes 
Allen Bradley ControlLogix 
1739 
No Yes 
Allen Bradley MicroLogix 
1100 
No Yes 
 
4.3.4 Logging Capabilities 
The logging capability is designed to record any interaction with the emulated 
PLC.  The traffic captured on the emulated PLC using tcpdump and logged on a remote 
logging device.  During the valid Modbus TCP traffic, the connection with the emulated 
PLC is logged, all six commands are logged and the connection tear down with the 
emulated PLC is logged.  Figure 4.8 shows the syslog entry connection and commands 
from the Triangle MicroWorks functionality test. 
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Figure 4.8: Syslog entries of interactions with the emulated PLC. 
Appendix C.1 provides screenshots of all the packets captured for the HMI and on the 
emulated PLC.  Both figures show that there are 23 packets transmitted during the test 
case for both Triangle MicroWorks and Modbus Poll, demonstrating the ability to 
correctly log the interactions. 
 During the state functionality test, the emulated PLC and the HMI captured 14 
packets.  Appendix C.1 provides screenshots of both Wireshark captures displaying the 
packets communicated across the channel.  Figure 4.9 below shows that the logging 
device is able to log all the traffic sent to it during the test.  The connection and tear 
down, both the read commands, and the write command are all logged. 
Logging is also examined during the port scan against the emulated device.  The 
number of packets captured on the emulated PLC is compared to the number of packets 
captured on the HMI.  During the intense scan of the emulated PLC, tcpdump fails to log 
all the packets.  The amount of packets that are captured on the HMI is 147,295 packets, 
compared to only 44,838 packets captured on the emulated PLC.  The device is able to 
respond to all operational traffic; however, it is not able to log all messages.  The 
tcpdump records packets for approximately eleven seconds then ceases to log packets for 
approximately fifteen minutes while it responds to the network traffic load.  While not 
Figure 4.9: Syslog entries from read, write, read test. 
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every packet was checked for a response during the test a look through the Wireshark 
capture on the HMI appeared as though the emulated PLC is able to respond to all the 
packets being sent to the device.  It appears as though the CPU cycles during this period 
of time are all allocated for the response to network traffic and the logging is not given 
any of these cycles.  This is a shortfall in that an attack could flood the device and exploit 
the system without the events being logged.  The syslog is also checked to see if the 
connections to the device are logged.  The syslog, much like that of tcpdump, fails to log 
all connections and packets to the device.  There are only 165 packets captured in the 
syslog and one connection to the emulated PLC recorded. 
Logging was also evaluated in the banner grabbing test.  The traffic comparison 
between the number of packets captured on the HMI and the number of packets captured 
on the emulated PLC (8 packets) are equal for the command sent from Triangle 
MicroWorks.  The Wireshark captures from the HMI and emulated PLC are shown in 
Appendix C.3. 
The verification that interactions with the emulated PLC are logged on a remote 
device is also evaluated.  The connection with the emulated PLC, the request command 
and the connection tear down are all identified and logged.  Figure 4.10 shows the 
connection and command sent from Triangle MicroWorks as logged in the syslog. 
 
Figure 4.10: Syslog entries for banner grab. 
The invalid traffic logging is also evaluated to see if the emulated PLC correctly 
logged all interactions.  The number of packets captured on the emulated PLC correlates 
with the number of packets captured on the HMI (4 packets).  Appendix C.4 provides 
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screenshots of the captured traffic.  The verification that any interaction with the 
emulated PLC is logged on a remote logging device is checked.  In this case, the failed 
connection with the emulated PLC is logged and the successful completion of the SYN 
with the valid TCP checksum is also shown in the logs. Figure 4.11 below shows the 
connection and command sent from Triangle MicroWorks as logged in the syslog. 
 
Figure 4.11: Syslog entry from invalid TCP checksum. 
4.3.5 Qualitative Evaluation 
An ICS Subject Matter Expert (SME) from the 262nd Air National Guard unit 
evaluated the emulated PLC using assessment techniques.  The emulated PLC responded 
in a manner consistent with an operational PLC during evaluation.  The individual stated 
that based on the Modbus characteristics, operational parameters and interactive sessions, 
the emulated PLC would have been considered an operational PLC typically encountered 
during an ICS assessment.  The findings indicate that an attacker attempting to exploit a 
PLC target would not readily discern the differences between the emulated PLC and an 
operational PLC.  The ICS SME from the 262nd recommended inclusion of a web server 
in the next iteration, as this is the service most used for remote access and exploitation by 
malicious actors. 
4.4 Analysis 
 The emulated PLC successfully emulates the six Modbus TCP commands based 
on the RFC as tested with Triangle MicroWorks Protocol Test Harness.  The emulated 
PLC also maintains system state as expected in an operational PLC.  The emulated PLC 
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is responsive as an operational PLC instead of a Linux machine to three of the four 
fingerprinting methods common to ICS.  The MAC address of the emulated PLC is easily 
configured to appear as a Siemens Automation PLC.  Port scans for the PLC demonstrate 
Modbus TCP server process and the OS detection is not able to successfully fingerprint 
the device.  The emulated PLC is able to successfully respond to banner grabbing 
techniques used to fingerprint a device running a Modbus server.  The emulated PLC also 
successfully responds to invalid traffic in the same manner as other PLCs.  Finally, 
evaluation of the emulated PLC by a subject matter expert demonstrates the ability to 
appear as a legitimate operational PLC to an external individual using ICS assessment 
techniques. 
 The emulation of the PLC is successful; however, a shortfall is identified with the 
logging functionality.  The logging functionality failed to properly log all traffic during 
intense port scan.  The logging is able to catch up before the scan is finished, however, 
that could miss valuable information during an attack.   The logging capability requires 
further evaluation.  The other services during the intense traffic load also need to be 
examined to evaluate if the performance of other services is degraded during this time.  
Regardless, the demonstrated ability is an improvement over current logging capabilities 
at the field device level. 
4.5 Results Summary 
The emulated PLC successfully passes fingerprinting techniques used to classify 
the device as a PLC.  The emulated PLC successfully responds to Modbus TCP traffic 
and maintains the proper system state.  The device also responds to invalid traffic in the 
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same manner as legitimate PLCs.  Although interaction with the emulated PLC was 
appropriately logged, further evaluation is required to determine traffic and bandwidth 
limits.  
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Conclusions  
This research introduces a novel approach to help secure ICS.  The PLC 
emulation device offers many capabilities associated with employment in the operational 
ICS environment.  The device helps identify reconnaissance and exploitation attempts 
against an operational ICS.  During scanning, an attacker attempts to identify available 
systems on the network.  Once identified, an attacker may attempt to manipulate 
parameters to alter system functionality.  In each instance, the PLC emulation device 
identifies the attempted actions and logs the events. 
In addition to identifying attempted exploitation, the PLC emulation device offers 
situational awareness.  Often times, asset owners have only awareness of network traffic 
and operating characteristics as reported at the HMI.  The PLC emulation device 
characterizes network traffic patterns and identifies erroneous communications.  Indeed, 
the device helps provide holistic awareness of the system and can be used as an early 
detection against propagating malware that is targeting ICS.  Finally, the logging 
capability provides insight into attack characteristics. By deploying PLC emulation 
devices across a wide range of ICS, logging can be evaluated to determine attacker tactics 
and techniques. 
Although the PLC emulation device offers security protections against an external 
attacker and malware, it is important to note that it may not be as effective against trusted 
insiders.  Because insiders have explicit knowledge of ICS operations, awareness that the 
PLC emulation device is employed may result in the attacker avoiding communication 
with the device.  Regardless, the approach demonstrates utility for increasing the security 
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posture for ICS.  Indeed, use of the emulated PLC device affords a capability that is 
inexpensive, configurable, portable, and offers event logging. 
5.2 Future Work 
5.2.1 Further Protocol Development 
Currently the emulated PLC only emulates a portion of the Modbus TCP protocol.  
Follow on work includes development of the additional functions in the Modbus TCP 
standard to create a more robust solution.  Further development also includes adding 
additional ICS communication protocols such as DNP3 and EtherNet/IP to make the 
device. 
5.2.2 Levels of Implementation 
Follow on work for the emulated PLC includes expanding the current level of 
services offered by the device.  Currently the device successfully emulates the protocol 
level and application level for Modbus TCP.  The stack level is partially emulated 
through the use of iptables and configuring responses in Scapy to respond in a similar 
manner to ICS devices.  Future work is to fully implement the stack level of a PLC.  
Scapy can be used to fully implement a response for all iterations of packets.  Working 
on additional application level programs such as a web server allow for enhanced PLC 
emulation. 
5.2.3 Response Time  
Future work requires comparison of the response time for the current emulated 
PLC to that of a real PLC.  With the knowledge of honeypots in the IT sector, response 
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time is used to determine if an attacker is communicating with a legitimate computer or if 
it is a honeypot.   
5.2.4 Traffic Loss 
During this research there was traffic that failed to be logged during heavy traffic 
loads.  Determining the reason for traffic loss and a solution to better handle the traffic 
when it increases is important.  Successfully capturing all packets is needed to help 
determine the attack characteristics in ICS networks. 
5.2.5 Ladder Logic and Firmware Implementation 
The implementation of ladder logic allows enhanced emulation of a PLC.  If 
ladder logic is implemented, the devices the values on the device would be constantly 
changing to help trick an attacker.  If an attacker was scanning the network waiting to see 
how the values are changing then the device could emulate the fluctuation of a pressure 
sensor reading changing frequently.    
Likewise is the ability to allow firmware updates to a device.  While it would not 
update any actual firmware, emulating the traffic to and from the emulated PLC would 
make an attacker assume that he is interacting with a real PLC.  Once the firmware 
update has completed, the emulation will then save that state so if later the same attacker 
attempted to scan for current firmware it would appear as though the firmware is the new 
version. 
5.2.6 Serial Implementation 
Implementing an emulated device that communicates over serial lines instead of 
Ethernet TCP/IP cables would be the next capture interface.  Many devices still 
communicate over serial lines and adding the capability enables the device to broaden the 
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array of devices that it can emulate.  Much of the communication that is discussed in 
current ICS systems is the communication over Ethernet because it is readily accessible.  
Serial communication would have to communicate through an HMI that could be 
configured as a honeypot. 
5.2.7 Ethernet Header Manufacturing Tags 
Ethernet header manufacturing tags are another way to commonly fingerprint an 
ICS device and this needs to be evaluated as future work.  This also can be implemented 
with the use of Scapy easily once the knowledge of the header tags in acquired.   
5.3 Concluding Remarks 
 The primary goal of this research is to develop an inexpensive, configurable and 
portable emulation device that contains logging capabilities.  In order to properly emulate 
a PLC, the emulated PLC device avoids common fingerprinting techniques specific to 
ICS devices.  This research develops such a device that is able to be expanded upon and 
deployed to a live environment to better characterize and identify attacks on ICS 
networks. 
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Appendix A: Setting Up Emulated PLC 
 
I. BUILDING OVERO OPEN EMBEDDED IMAGE 
Guide: http://gumstix.org/software-development/open-embedded/61-using-the-open-
embedded-build-system.html 
1) Build a new machine with the Ubuntu 10.10 x86 ISO file to act as the 
development laptop. 
a. http://releases.ubuntu.com/10.10/ubuntu-10.10-desktop-i386.iso 
2) Once booted, use the Update Manager to update the default packages.  Do not 
upgrade to Ubuntu 11.04 or other versions. 
3) Open the synaptic package manager and select the following packages for install: 
a. git 
b. subversion 
c. gcc 
d. build-essential 
e. help2man 
f. diffstat 
g. texi2html 
h. texinfo 
i. libncurses5-dev 
j. cvs 
k. gawk 
l. python2.7-dev 
m. python-pysqlite2 
n. unzip 
o. chrpath 
p. ccache 
4) sudo dpkg-reconfigure dash 
a. Answer No when asked whether you want to install dash as /bin/sh. 
5) mkdir -p ~/overo-oe 
6) cd ~/overo-oe 
7) git clone git://gitorious.org/gumstix-oe/mainline.git org.openembedded.dev 
8) cd org.openembedded.dev 
9) git checkout --track -b overo-2011.03 origin/overo-2011.03 
10) cd ~/overo-oe 
11)  git clone git://git.openembedded.org/bitbake bitbake 
12) cd bitbake 
13) git checkout 1.12.0 
14) cd ~/overo-oe 
15) cp -r org.openembedded.dev/contrib/gumstix/build . 
16) cp ~/.bashrc ~/bashrc.bak 
17) cat ~/overo-oe/build/profile >> ~/.bashrc 
18) Close the Terminal window and open a new one. 
19) gedit ~/overo-oe/org.openembedded.dev/recipes/images/omap3-console-image.bb 
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a. Add iptables to the TOOLS_INSTALL section 
b. Save and close the window 
20) bitbake omap3-console-image 
21) The Overo file system is built at: ~/overo-
oe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/omap3-console-image-overo.tar.bz2 
22) The Overo OE Linux Kernel is built at: ~/overo-
oe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/uImage-overo.bin 
 
II. RECONFIGURING THE OVERO KERNEL TO INCLUDE IPTABLES 
SUPPORT 
Guide: http://gumstix.8.n6.nabble.com/iptables-on-Overo-td663707.html 
1) On the development laptop: 
2) cd ~/overo-oe 
3) mkdir -p ./user.collection/recipes 
4) cp -r ./org.openembedded.dev/recipes/linux /home/<user>/overo-
oe/user.collection/recipes 
a. (bitbake looks at user.collection first.  org.embedded.dev holds the 
original copy) 
5) cd ~/overo-oe/tmp/work/overo-angstrom-linux-gnueabi/linux-omap3<kernel 
version>/git 
6) make menuconfig ARCH=arm 
a.  Networking Support 
     Networking Options 
    [*] Network Packet Filtering (netfilter) 
     Network Packet Filtering (netfilter) 
      Core Netfilter Configuration 
     ENABLE [M] all options in this menu 
      IP: Netfilter Configuration 
     [*] proc/sysctl compatibility with old 
connection tracking 
     ENABLE [M] all other menu options 
     IPv6: Netfilter Configuration 
     ENABLE [M] all options in this menu 
b. Exit 
c. Save: Yes 
7) ls –al 
a. Check that date was made today 
8) cp ./.config ~/overo-oe/user.collection/recipes/linux/linux-omap3/overo/defconfig 
9) cd ~/overo 
10) bitbake –c clean linux-omap3 
11) bitbake –c build linux-omap3 
12) The Overo OE Linux Kernel is built at: ~/overo-
oe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/uImage-overo.bin 
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III. PARTITIONING BOOTABLE SD CARD FOR OVERO IMAGE 
Guide: http://gumstix.org/create-a-bootable-microsd-card.html 
Guide: http://gumstix.org/how-to/70-writing-images-to-flash.html 
1) df 
2) umount /media/… 
3) umount /… 
 
 
IV. DEPLOYING OVERO IMAGE 
1) On the development laptop: 
2) Delete the current file structure, if any, on the EXT3 partition of the micro SD 
card 
a. sudo nautilus 
b. Edit > Preferences > Behavior > Check Include a Delete command that 
bypasses Trash 
c. Select rootfs 
d.  Select all files > Right Click > Delete 
3) Copy the contents of ~/overo-oe/tmp/deploy/glibc/images/overo/omap3-console-
image-overo.tar.bz2 into the rootfs partition of the micro SD card. 
4) On the micro SD card FAT partition: 
a. Delete uImage 
b. Copy uImage-<kernel version>-overo.bin into / 
c. Rename uImage-<kernel version>-overo.bin to uImage 
 
V. BOOTING OVERO IMAGE CONSOLE 
1) Power off the Overo board. 
2) Insert the newly created micro SD card into the micro SD slot of the Overo board. 
3) Connect a USB cable between the “Console” mini USB B port on the Overo 
board and the development laptop with ckermit installed. 
4) On the development laptop create a file called overo_serial.cfg 
set line /dev/ttyUSB0 (Note: 0 might changed) 
set flow-control none 
set carrier-watch off 
set speed 115200 
set reliable 
fast 
set prefixing all 
set file type bin 
set rec pack 4096 
set send pack 4096 
set window 5 
 connect 
5) Open a terminal and type: 
a. kermit 
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i. take overo_serial.cfg 
6) Power on the Overo board.  You should see the boot sequence displayed on the 
terminal.   
7) Break the boot sequence when prompted then type: 
a. nand erase 240000 20000 
b. reset 
8) Enter “root” as the username to log in. 
9) To exit kermit:  
a. ctrl-/-c 
b. Type: exit 
 
VI. COMPILING SCAPY FOR OVERO IMAGE 
1) On the development laptop  
a. Go to www.secdev.org/projects/scapy 
b. Scroll down to the section labeled Download 
c. Download Scapy’s latest revision 
d. Unzip the folder to the desktop 
e. scp –r <foldername> <IP address of gumstix>:/home/root 
f. You will also want to move over the canary.py script 
g. scp –r canary.py <IP address if gumstix>:/home/root 
2) On the gumstix now type the following commands 
a. opkg update 
b. opkg install python-core 
c. opkg install python-modules 
d. mkdir /usr/include/python2.6 
3) Go back to the development laptop  
a. sudo scp /usr/include/python2.6/pyconfig.h <IP 
address>:/usr/include/python2.6 
4) On the gumstix 
a. cd <foldername of scapy files> 
b. python setup.py install 
 
VII. COMPILING TCPDUMP FOR OVERO IMAGE 
1) On the development laptop: 
a. bitbake tcpdump 
2) Packages will be built in: /overo-oe/tmp/deploy/glibc/ipk/armv7a 
3) Copy the packages onto the Overo EXT3 partition 
a. sudo scp ./tcpdump_<version number>.ipk <overo IP address>:/home/root 
4) On the Overo console, install the package 
a. opkg install ./tcpdump_<version number>.ipk 
 
VIII. COMPILING BITSTRING FOR OVERO IMAGE 
1) On the development laptop  
a. Go to http://code.google.com/p/python-bitstring/downloads/list 
b. Download bitstring latest revision 
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c. Unzip the folder to the desktop 
d. scp –r <foldername> <IP address of gumstix>:/home/root 
2) On the gumstix 
a. cd <foldername of bitstring files> 
b. python setup.py install 
 
IX. REMOVING UNWANTED PACKAGES 
1) update-rc.d –f ntpd remove 
2) update-rc.d –f avahi-daemon remove 
3) update-rc.d –f portmap remove 
 
X. CONFIGURING STARTUP SCRIPT 
1) Create a file in the /etc/init.d directory called canary.sh with the contents below 
#!/bin/bash 
 
/etc/init.d/networking start 
 
ifconfig eth0 hw ether 00:0e:8c:bb:1f:56 
ifconfig eth0 up 
dhclient eth0 
 
ifconfig eth1 up 
ifconfig eth1 172.16.1.10 
 
/etc/init.d/sshd start 
 
iptables -A OUTPUT -p tcp --sport 502 -j DROP  
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --sport 502 -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP -p tcp --sport 22 
iptables -A INPUT -j DROP -p tcp --sport 111 
iptables -A INPUT -j LOG --log-level 6 -m pkttype --pkt-type host -i eth0  
iptables -A INPUT -j REJECT --reject-with tcp-reset -i eth0 
iptables -A FORWARD -j REJECT -i eth0 
 
nohup tcpdump -s 0 -i eth0 -C 10 -w /tmp/capture.pcap & 
 
nohup python /home/root/canary.py & 
 
2) update-rc.d canary.sh defaults 100 
 
X. CONFIGURING SSH TO RUN ON ETH1 ONLY 
1) cd /etc/ssh 
2) vi sshd_config 
a. Add the lines (These lines may be commented and you just need to 
uncomment them.) 
 67 
i. Port 22 
ii. AddressFamily inet 
iii. ListenAddress 172.16.1.10 
b. Restart ssh (/etc/init.d/sshd restart) 
 
XI. CONFIGURING THE OVERO BOARD TO WORK WITH THE TOBI DUO 
1) This is only needed if you have used the Tobi board to set up the Overo Board 
2) Place the Overo Board on the Tobi Duo Expansion Board and power on the 
board. 
3) Once the board has come online (Detected by the blue light on the CPU stops 
flashing) unplug the board and place the board back on the Tobi Expansion board. 
4) Turn on the Overo  
5) vi /etc/udev/rules.d/70-persistant-net.rules 
6) There should now be three net device () lines in this file eth0 – eth2. 
7) Edit the eth1 line so that NAME=”eth0” 
8) Edit the eth2 line so that NAME=”eth1” 
9) If you restart the Overo with the Tobi-Duo extension you should now be able to 
SSH to 172.16.1.10. 
 
 
XII. CONFIGURING THE SYSLOG SERVER 
1) Edit the /etc/init.d/sysklogd file. 
2) Find the line SYSLOGD=“” and replace it with SYSLOGD=”-rm 0” 
3) You will also need to edit the /etc/syslog.conf file. 
4) There is a line that starts with *.=info;…… -/var/log/messages 
a. After *.=info; add kern.!=info; 
5) After this line also add in the line kern.=info /var/log/canary.log 
6) Restart the syslog service 
a. /etc/init.d/syslog restart 
 
XIII. CONFIGURING SYSLOG ON THE GUMSTIX 
1) Edit the file /etc/syslog-ng.conf 
2) In the destination section add in the following line. 
a. Destination logging {udp(“172.16.1.11” port(514));}; 
3) Further down in the log section add the following line. 
a. log { source(src); destination(logging); }; 
4) Restart the syslog service 
a. /etc/init.d/syslog restart 
 
  
 68 
Appendix B: Canary.py code 
#! /usr/bin/python 
 
### Dustin Berman 
### AFIT/ENG 
### Masters of Cyber Operations, June 2012 
 
### File Information 
### canary.py 
### Emulates a PLC with the following commands: Read Coil, Read Discrete Inputs, Read Holding 
Registers, Read Input Registers, Write Single Coil, Write Single Register 
### This will also log any connections to the syslog 
 
# Imports 
import logging, platform, random 
import syslog 
from struct import * 
from bitstring import BitArray 
 
# Designed with Scapy 2.2.0 
logging.getLogger("scapy").setLevel(1) 
from scapy.all import * 
 
# Display the version of Python and Scapy being used 
print "Python %s\tScapy %s" % (platform.python_version(), conf.version) 
 
#Global Variables 
numcoils = 100 
numdinputs = 100 
numinputregisters = 100 
numholdregisters = 100 
coil = ['0']*numcoils 
dinputs = ['0']*numdinputs 
inputregister = ['\x00\x00']*numinputregisters 
holdregister = ['\x00\x00']*numholdregisters 
vendorname = "Allen Bradley" 
productcode = "Micrologix 1500" 
majorminorrevision = "V1.12.1" 
ipid = random.randint(1,65535) 
 
# Dictionaries 
# Need to add in all function codes here 
function_code_enum = {1:"Read Coil", 2:"Read Discrete Inputs", 3:"Read Holding Registers", 4:"Read 
Input Registers", 5:"Write Single Coil", 6:"Write Single Register", 43:"Encapsulated Interface Transport"}  
function_code = {"Read Coil":1, "Read Discrete Inputs":2, "Read Holding Registers":3, "Read Input 
Registers":4, "Write Single Coil":5, "Write Single Register":6, "Encapsulated Interface Transport":43} 
 
# Modbus Header 
class Modbus(Packet): 
 name = "Modbus" 
 fields_desc = [ShortField("transaction", 0), 
  ShortField("protocol", 0), 
  ShortField("length", 0), 
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  ByteField("unit", 0), 
  ByteEnumField("function", 1, function_code_enum) 
  ] 
 
 # This will determine how to dissect the rest of the packet 
 def guess_payload_class(self, payload): 
  if self.function == function_code['Read Coil']: 
   return ReadCoil 
  elif self.function == function_code['Read Discrete Inputs']: 
   return ReadDiscreteInputs 
  elif self.function == function_code['Read Holding Registers']: 
   return ReadHoldingRegisters 
  elif self.function == function_code['Read Input Registers']: 
   return ReadInputRegisters 
  elif self.function == function_code['Write Single Coil']: 
   return WriteSingleCoil 
  elif self.function == function_code['Write Single Register']: 
   return WriteSingleRegister 
  elif self.function == function_code['Encapsulated Interface Transport']: 
   return EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest 
  else: 
   return Packet.guess_payload_class(self,payload) 
 
# Read Coil Payload 
class ReadCoil(Packet): 
 name= "ReadCoil" 
 fields_desc = [ShortField("startcoil", 0), 
  ShortField("quantitycoils", 0) 
  ] 
 
# Read Coil Response Payload 
class ReadCoilResponse(Packet): 
 name= "ReadCoilResponse" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0), 
  StrField("status", "") 
  ] 
 
# Read Discrete Inputs Payload 
class ReadDiscreteInputs(Packet): 
 name= "ReadDiscreteInputs" 
 fields_desc = [ShortField("startinput", 0), 
  ShortField("quantityinputs", 0) 
  ] 
 
# Read Discrete Inputs Response Payloads 
class ReadDiscreteInputsResponse(Packet): 
 name= "ReadDiscreteInputsResponse" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0), 
  StrField("status", "") 
  ] 
 
# Read Holding Registers Payload 
class ReadHoldingRegisters(Packet): 
 name= "ReadHoldingRegisters" 
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 fields_desc = [ShortField("startaddress", 0), 
  ShortField("quantityregs", 0) 
  ] 
 
# Read Holding Registers Response Payload 
class ReadHoldingRegistersResponse(Packet): 
 name= "ReadHoldingRegistersResponse" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0), 
  StrField("status", "") 
  ] 
 
# Read Input Registers Payload 
class ReadInputRegisters(Packet): 
 name= "ReadInputRegisters" 
 fields_desc = [ShortField("startaddress", 0), 
  ShortField("quantityregs", 0) 
  ] 
 
# Read Input Registers Response Payload 
class ReadInputRegistersResponse(Packet): 
 name= "ReadHoldingRegistersResponse" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("bytecount", 0), 
  StrField("status", "") 
  ] 
 
# Write Single Coil Payload 
class WriteSingleCoil(Packet): 
 name = "WriteSingleCoil" 
 fields_desc = [ShortField("coilnumber", 0), 
  ByteField("state", 0), 
  ByteField("padding", 0) 
  ] 
 
# Write Single Register Payload 
class WriteSingleRegister(Packet): 
 name= "WriteSingleRegister" 
 fields_desc = [ShortField("regaddress", 0), 
  ShortField("regvalue", 0) 
  ] 
 
# Encapsulated Interface Transport Request Payload 
class EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest(Packet): 
 name= "EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("meitype", 0), 
  ByteField("deviceid", 1), 
  ByteField("objectid", 0) 
  ] 
 
# Encapsulated Interface Transport Response Payload 
class EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse(Packet): 
 name= "EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("meitype", 0), 
  ByteField("deviceid", 1), 
  ByteField("conformity", 1), 
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  ByteField("morefollows", 0), 
  ByteField("objectid", 0), 
  ByteField("numobjects",0) 
  ] 
 
# Encapsulated Interface Transport Object Payload 
class EncapsulatedInterfaceObject(Packet): 
 name= "EncapsulatedInterfaceObject" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("objectid", 0), 
  ByteField("objectlength", 0), 
  StrField("objectvalue","") 
  ] 
 
# Error Payload 
class Error(Packet): 
 name= "Error" 
 fields_desc = [ByteField("code", 1) 
  ] 
 
# Bind Layers 
bind_layers(TCP, Modbus, sport = 502) 
bind_layers(TCP, Modbus, dport = 502) 
 
# Responding to a SYN request 
def responsesyn(packet): 
 global ipid  
 #Write the connection to the syslog 
 syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' is connecting to the Honeypot Device') 
  
 #Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
 response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
 response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
 response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
 response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
 ipid = random.randint(1,65535)  
 response[IP].id = ipid 
 ipid = ipid + 1 
 response[IP].flags = 2  
 response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
 response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
 response[TCP].seq = random.randint(1,4294967295) 
 response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 1 
 response[TCP].flags = 'SA' 
 if packet[TCP].window == 1 or packet[TCP].window == 63 or packet[TCP].window == 4 or 
packet[TCP].window == 16: 
  response[TCP].options = [('MSS', 1460), ('NOP', None), ('WScale', 0), ('NOP', None), 
('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (0, 4294967295))]  
 elif packet[TCP].window == 512: 
  response[TCP].options = [('MSS', 1460),('NOP', None), ('NOP', None), ('Timestamp', (0, 
4294967295))] 
 else: 
  response[TCP].options = packet[TCP].options 
 del(response[IP].chksum) 
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 del(response[TCP].chksum) 
 del(response[IP].len)  
 #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
 sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
# Responding to a SYN request 
def responserstack(packet): 
 global ipid  
 #Write the connection to the syslog 
 syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' is closing the connection to the Honeypot 
Device') 
  
 #Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
 response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
 response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
 response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
 response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
 response[IP].id = ipid 
 ipid = ipid + 1 
 response[IP].flags = 2 
 response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
 response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
 response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
 response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 1 
 response[TCP].flags = 'RA' 
 response[TCP].options = packet[TCP].options 
 del(response[IP].chksum) 
 del(response[TCP].chksum) 
 del(response[IP].len)  
 #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
 sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
# Building a response to Read Coil 
def responsereadcoil(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back  
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
 
 if packet.haslayer(ReadCoil): 
 
  # This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of coils it requested. 
  if packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils > numcoils or packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils < 1: 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Coil request')   
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction  
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 3 
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  # This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of 
Outputs is valid 
  elif (packet[ReadCoil].startcoil < 0 or packet[ReadCoil].startcoil > numcoils) or 
((packet[ReadCoil].startcoil + packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils) > numcoils): 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Coil request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 2 
   
  # Else the Read Coil was a valid command 
  else: 
   response = response/Modbus()/ReadCoilResponse() 
   # Write the valid request to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Coil 
request') 
   
   bytecount = (packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils/8) 
   partbytecount = packet[ReadCoil].quantitycoils%8 
   if partbytecount != 0: 
    bytecount = bytecount + 1 
   response[ReadCoilResponse].bytecount = bytecount 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction  
   response[Modbus].length = response[ReadCoilResponse].bytecount + 3 
   leadzero = (8 - partbytecount)%8 
   status = [] 
   output = '' 
  
   # This is + 7 because each high order bit is the highest output address.   
   # (Look at Modbus Application Protocol Specification V1.1b at www.Modbus-
IDA.org) 
   current = packet[ReadCoil].startcoil + 7 
    
   # This will build each byte to be sent back to the master. 
   for x in range(0, bytecount): 
    if x == (bytecount-1): 
     for z in range(current,current-leadzero, -1): 
      status.append('0') 
     for k in range(current-leadzero, current-8, -1): 
      status.append(coil[k]) 
     current = current + 8 
     status = ''.join(status) 
     # Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the 
output string. 
     temp = BitArray(bin=status) 
     value = temp.uint 
     string = pack('!h', value) 
     output = output + string[1]    
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     status = [] 
    else: 
     for y in range(current, current-8, -1): 
      status.append(coil[y]) 
     current = current + 8 
     status = ''.join(status) 
     # Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the 
output string. 
     temp = BitArray(bin=status) 
     value = temp.uint 
     string = pack('!h', value) 
     output = output + string[1]    
     status = [] 
  
   response[ReadCoilResponse].status = output 
  response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
  response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
  response[IP].flags = 0 
  response[IP].ttl = 64 
  response[IP].id = ipid 
  ipid = ipid + 1 
  response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
  response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
  response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
  response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
  response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
  response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
  response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12 
  response[TCP].window = 4096 
  del(response[IP].chksum) 
  del(response[TCP].chksum) 
  del(response[IP].len) 
  #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
  sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
 else: 
  responseerror(packet) 
  
# Building a response to Read Discrete Inputs 
def responsereaddiscreteinputs(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
 
 if packet.haslayer(ReadDiscreteInputs): 
  # This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of inputs it requested. 
  if packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs > numdinputs or 
packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs < 1: 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Discrete Input request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
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   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 3 
   
  # This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of 
Outputs is valid 
  elif (packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput < 0 or packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput 
>= numdinputs) or ((packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput + packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs) 
>= numdinputs): 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Discrete Input request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 2 
  
  # Else the Read Discrete Inputs was a valid command 
  else: 
   response = response/Modbus()/ReadDiscreteInputsResponse() 
   # Write the valid request to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Discrete 
Input request') 
  
   bytecount = (packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs/8) 
   partbytecount = packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].quantityinputs%8 
   if partbytecount != 0: 
    bytecount = bytecount + 1 
   response[ReadDiscreteInputsResponse].bytecount = bytecount 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction  
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function  
   response[Modbus].length = response[ReadDiscreteInputsResponse].bytecount + 
3 
   leadzero = (8 - partbytecount)%8 
   status = [] 
   output = '' 
  
   # This is + 7 because each high order bit is the highest output address.   
   # (Look at Modbus Application Protocol Specification V1.1b at www.Modbus-
IDA.org) 
   current = packet[ReadDiscreteInputs].startinput + 7 
  
   # This will build each byte to be sent back to the master. 
   for x in range(0, bytecount): 
    if x == (bytecount-1): 
     for z in range(current,current-leadzero, -1): 
      status.append('0') 
     for k in range(current-leadzero, current-8, -1): 
      status.append(dinputs[k]) 
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     current = current + 8 
     # Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the 
output string. 
     status = ''.join(status) 
     temp = BitArray(bin=status) 
     value = temp.uint 
     string = pack('!h', value) 
     output = output + string[1]    
     status = [] 
    else: 
     for y in range(current, current-8, -1): 
      status.append(dinputs[y]) 
     current = current + 8 
     # Below will take the bits and create a byte to be added to the 
output string. 
     status = ''.join(status) 
     temp = BitArray(bin=status) 
     value = temp.uint 
     string = pack('!h', value) 
     output = output + string[1]    
     status = [] 
  
   response[ReadDiscreteInputsResponse].status = output  
  
  response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
  response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
  response[IP].flags = 0 
  response[IP].ttl = 64 
  response[IP].id = ipid 
  ipid = ipid + 1 
  response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
  response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
  response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
  response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
  response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
  response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
  response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12 
  response[TCP].window = 4096 
  del(response[IP].chksum) 
  del(response[TCP].chksum) 
  del(response[IP].len) 
  #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
  sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
 else: 
  responseerror(packet) 
  
# Building a response to Read Holding Registers 
def responsereadregisters(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
  
 if packet.haslayer(ReadHoldingRegisters): 
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  # This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of registers it requested. 
  if packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs < 1 or 
packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs > numholdregisters: 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Holding Registers request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 3 
  
  # This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of 
Outputs is valid 
  elif (packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress < 0 or 
packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress >= numholdregisters) or 
((packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs) >= 
numholdregisters): 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Holding Registers request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 2 
  
  # Else the Read Holding Register Request is valid 
  else: 
   response = response/Modbus()/ReadHoldingRegistersResponse() 
   # Write the valid request to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Holding 
Registers request') 
  
   response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].bytecount = 
packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs * 2 
   response[Modbus].length = 
response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].bytecount + 3 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function  
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
  
   # This will loop and add all the values requested to the status. 
   for x in range(packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress, 
(packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadHoldingRegisters].quantityregs)): 
    response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].status = 
response[ReadHoldingRegistersResponse].status + holdregister[x] 
  
  response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
  response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
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  response[IP].flags = 0 
  response[IP].ttl = 64 
  response[IP].id = ipid 
  ipid = ipid + 1 
  response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
  response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
  response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
  response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
  response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
  response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
  response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12 
  response[TCP].window = 4096  
  del(response[IP].chksum) 
  del(response[TCP].chksum) 
  del(response[IP].len) 
  #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
  sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
 else: 
  responseerror(packet) 
 
# Building a response to Read Input Registers 
def responsereadinputregisters(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
  
 if packet.haslayer(ReadInputRegisters): 
  # This checks to see if the request was valid in the number of registers it requested. 
  if packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs < 1 or 
packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs > numinputregisters: 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Input Registers request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 3 
  
  # This checks to see if the starting address is valid and the starting address + Quatity of 
Outputs is valid 
  elif (packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress < 0 or 
packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress >= numinputregisters) or 
((packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs) >= 
numinputregisters): 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Read 
Input Registers request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
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   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 2 
  
  # Else the Read Input Registers is valid 
  else: 
   response = response/Modbus()/ReadInputRegistersResponse() 
   # Write the valid request to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Read Input 
Registers request') 
  
   response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].bytecount = 
packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs * 2 
   response[Modbus].length = response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].bytecount + 
3 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function  
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction  
  
   # This will loop and add all the values requested to the status. 
   for x in range(packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress, 
(packet[ReadInputRegisters].startaddress + packet[ReadInputRegisters].quantityregs)): 
    response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].status = 
response[ReadInputRegistersResponse].status + inputregister[x] 
  
  response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
  response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
  response[IP].flags = 0 
  response[IP].ttl = 64 
  response[IP].id = ipid 
  ipid = ipid + 1 
  response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
  response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
  response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
  response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
  response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
  response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
  response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12 
  response[TCP].window = 4096 
  del(response[IP].chksum) 
  del(response[TCP].chksum) 
  del(response[IP].len) 
  #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
  sendp(response, loop=0) 
  
 else: 
  responseerror(packet) 
 
# Building a response to Write Single Coil 
def responsewritecoil(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
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 if packet.haslayer(WriteSingleCoil): 
  # This checks to see if the request value was valid. 
  if not (packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 0 or packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 255): 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write 
Single Coil request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 3 
 
  # This checks to see if the coil number is valid  
  elif packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber < 0 or packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber >= 
numcoils: 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write 
Single Coil request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 2 
 
  # Else the Write Single Coil request is valid 
  else: 
   response = response/Modbus()/WriteSingleCoil() 
   # Write the valid request to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Write Single 
Coil request')   
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = packet[Modbus].length 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function 
   response[WriteSingleCoil].state = packet[WriteSingleCoil].state 
   response[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber = packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber 
    
   # If the value is 255 switch the value to 1 else if it is 0 switch the value to 0. 
   if packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 255: 
    coil[packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber] = '1' 
   elif packet[WriteSingleCoil].state == 0: 
    coil[packet[WriteSingleCoil].coilnumber] = '0' 
  response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
  response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
  response[IP].flags = 0 
  response[IP].ttl = 64 
  response[IP].id = ipid 
  ipid = ipid + 1 
  response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
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  response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
  response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
  response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
  response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
  response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
  response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12 
  response[TCP].window = 4096 
  del(response[IP].chksum) 
  del(response[TCP].chksum) 
  del(response[IP].len) 
  #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
  sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
 else: 
  responseerror(packet) 
 
# Building a response to Write Single Register 
def responsewriteregister(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
  
 if packet.haslayer(WriteSingleRegister): 
  # This checks to see if the request value was valid. 
  if packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue < 0 or packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue > 
65535: 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write 
Single Register request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 3 
 
  # This checks to see if the register address is valid. 
  elif packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress < 0 or 
packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress >= numholdregisters: 
   # Write the error to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID Write 
Single Register request') 
  
   response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = 3 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
   response[Error].code = 2 
   
  # Else the Write Single Register request is valid 
  else: 
   response = response/Modbus()/WriteSingleRegister() 
 82 
   # Write the valid request to the syslog 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a valid Write Single 
Register request')   
 
   response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
   response[Modbus].length = packet[Modbus].length 
   response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
   response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function  
   response[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress = 
packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress 
   response[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue = packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue 
   # This updates the value of the register to be changed. 
   holdregister[packet[WriteSingleRegister].regaddress] = pack('!h', 
packet[WriteSingleRegister].regvalue) 
  
  response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
  response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
  response[IP].flags = 0 
  response[IP].ttl = 64 
  response[IP].id = ipid 
  ipid = ipid + 1 
  response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
  response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
  response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
  response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
  response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
  response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
  response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + 12 
  response[TCP].window = 4096 
  del(response[IP].chksum) 
  del(response[TCP].chksum) 
  del(response[IP].len) 
  #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
  sendp(response, loop=0) 
  
 else: 
  responseerror(packet) 
 
def responseencapsulatedinterface(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back  
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP() 
 if packet.haslayer(EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest): 
 
  # This checks to see if the request was valid MEI type 
  if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype == 14: 
   # Basic Device Identification Stream 
   if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid == 1: 
    # This must start with a 0 
    if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 0: 
     syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a 
VALID Encapsulated Interface Read Basic Information Request')  
     response = 
response/Modbus()/EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse() 
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     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].meitype = 
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].deviceid = 
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].conformity = 1 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].morefollows = 0 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].objectid = 0 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].numobjects = 3 
     length = len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse]) 
  
     #Building the objects to send in the packet 
     object1 = EncapsulatedInterfaceObject() 
     object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 0 
     object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue = 
vendorname 
     object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength = 
len(object1[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue) 
     object2 = EncapsulatedInterfaceObject() 
     object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 1 
     object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue = 
productcode 
     object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength = 
len(object2[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue) 
     object3 = EncapsulatedInterfaceObject() 
     object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 2 
     object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue = 
majorminorrevision 
     object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength = 
len(object3[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue) 
     response = response/object1/object2/object3 
     length = length + len(object1) + len(object2) + len(object3) + 
2  
     response[Modbus].length = length 
    else: 
     syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an 
INVALID Object ID code ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid))   
  
     response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
     response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction  
     response[Modbus].length = 3 
     response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
     response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
     response[Error].code = 2 
 
   # One Specific Identification Object 
   elif packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid == 4: 
    if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid >= 0 and 
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid < 3: 
     response = 
response/Modbus()/EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse()/EncapsulatedInterfaceObject() 
     syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent a 
VALID Encapsulated Interface Read Single Device Object Request')  
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].meitype = 
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype 
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     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].deviceid = 
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].conformity = 129 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].morefollows = 0 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].objectid = 0 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse].numobjects = 1 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid 
     if packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 0: 
      response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue = 
vendorname 
     elif packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 1: 
      response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue = 
productcode 
     elif packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid == 2: 
      response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue = 
majorminorrevision 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectlength = 
len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectvalue) 
     response[Modbus].length = 
len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceResponse]) + len(response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject]) 
     response[EncapsulatedInterfaceObject].objectid = 
packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid 
  
    else: 
     syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an 
INVALID Object ID code ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].objectid))   
  
     response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
     response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction  
     response[Modbus].length = 3 
     response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
     response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
     response[Error].code = 2 
 
   # The Read Device Code is not supported so respond with an error 
   else: 
    syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an 
INVALID Read Device ID code ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].deviceid))   
  
    response = response/Modbus()/Error() 
    response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction  
    response[Modbus].length = 3 
    response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
    response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
    response[Error].code = 3 
 
  # The MEI Type is not supported 
  else: 
   syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID MEI 
Type ' + str(packet[EncapsulatedInterfaceRequest].meitype)) 
   responseerror(packet) 
   
  response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
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  response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit   
  response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function  
  response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
  response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
  response[IP].flags = 0 
  response[IP].ttl = 64 
  response[IP].id = ipid 
  ipid = ipid + 1 
  response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
  response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
  response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
  response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
  response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
  response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
  response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + len(packet[TCP].payload) 
  response[TCP].window = 4096 
  del(response[IP].chksum) 
  del(response[TCP].chksum) 
  del(response[IP].len) 
  #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
  sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
 else: 
  responseerror(packet) 
 
def responseerror(packet): 
 global ipid 
 # Build a packet to send back 
 response = Ether()/IP()/TCP()/Modbus()/Error() 
  
 # Write the error to the syslog 
 syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an INVALID function code ' + 
str(packet[Modbus].function)) 
 
 response[Ether].src = packet[Ether].dst 
 response[Ether].dst = packet[Ether].src 
 response[IP].flags = 0 
 response[IP].ttl = 64 
 response[IP].id = ipid 
 ipid = ipid + 1 
 response[IP].src = packet[IP].dst 
 response[IP].dst = packet[IP].src 
 response[TCP].flags = 'PA'  
 response[TCP].sport = packet[TCP].dport 
 response[TCP].dport = packet[TCP].sport 
 response[TCP].seq = packet[TCP].ack 
 response[TCP].ack = packet[TCP].seq + len(packet[TCP].payload) 
 response[TCP].window = 4096 
 response[Modbus].transaction = packet[Modbus].transaction 
 response[Modbus].length = 3 
 response[Modbus].unit = packet[Modbus].unit 
  
 # This will change the high order bit to one unless it is already a 1. 
 if packet[Modbus].function > 127: 
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  response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function 
 else: 
  response[Modbus].function = packet[Modbus].function + 128 
 del(response[IP].chksum) 
 del(response[TCP].chksum) 
 del(response[IP].len) 
 #sendp will recalculate the checksums and IP length before sending the packet. 
 sendp(response, loop=0) 
 
 
def response(packet): 
 if packet.haslayer(TCP): 
  if packet[TCP].dport == 502: 
   originalChecksum=packet[TCP].chksum 
   originalIPChecksum=packet[IP].chksum  
   del packet[IP].chksum  
   del packet[TCP].chksum 
   packet=Ether(str(packet)) 
   recomputedIPChecksum=packet[IP].chksum 
   recomputedChecksum=packet[TCP].chksum 
   if originalChecksum == recomputedChecksum and originalIPChecksum == 
recomputedIPChecksum: 
    if packet.haslayer(Modbus) and packet[Modbus].protocol == 0: 
     if packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read Coil']: 
      responsereadcoil(packet) 
     elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read 
Discrete Inputs']: 
      responsereaddiscreteinputs(packet) 
     elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read Holding 
Registers']: 
      responsereadregisters(packet) 
     elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Read Input 
Registers']: 
      responsereadinputregisters(packet) 
     elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Write Single 
Coil']: 
      responsewritecoil(packet) 
     elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Write Single 
Register']: 
      responsewriteregister(packet) 
     elif packet[Modbus].function == function_code['Encapsulated 
Interface Transport']: 
      responseencapsulatedinterface(packet) 
     else: 
      responseerror(packet) 
    elif packet[TCP].flags == 2: 
     #send a SYN ACK response 
     responsesyn(packet) 
    elif packet[TCP].flags == 17: 
     #Closing down the connection to a FIN ACK 
     responserstack(packet) 
   elif not originalChecksum == recomputedChecksum: 
    syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an 
INVALID TCP checksum')  
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   else: 
    syslog.syslog(syslog.LOG_ALERT, packet[IP].src + ' sent an 
INVALID IP checksum')  
 return 
 
## This is the Main Script 
sniff(iface="eth0", store = 0, prn=lambda x: response(x)) 
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Appendix C: Emulated PLC Test Case Supporting Figures 
C.1 Functionality Test Through Modbus Traffic Emulation 
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C.2 Fingerprinting Port Scan Test Case 
 
Figure C.7: Nmap Intense Scan All TCP Ports, Emulated PLC 
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Figure C.8: Nmap Intense Scan All TCP Ports, CompactLogix 1769 
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Figure C.9: Nmap Intense Scan All TCP Ports, MicroLogix 1100 
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Figure C.10: Nmap Operating System Scan on Ethernet/IP port ControlLogix 1769 
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Figure C.11: Nmap Operating System Scan on Ethernet/IP port MicroLogix 1100 
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C.3 Fingerprinting Banner Grab Test Case 
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C.4 Invalid Traffic Test Case 
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Appendix D: List of Acronyms  
 
CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DMZ Demilitarized Zone 
EIT Encapsulated Interface Transport 
FIFO First-In-First-Out 
GUI Graphical User Interface 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
ICS Industrial Control System 
IDS Intrusion Detection System 
IT Information Technology 
MBAP Modbus Application Protocol 
MEI Modbus Encapsulated Interface Transport 
MTU Master Terminal Unit 
OS  Operating System 
PDU Protocol Data Unit 
 105 
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 
RFC Request For Comment 
RTU Remote Terminal Unit 
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
SSA Sector Specific Agencies 
 106 
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